Transnationalism and Minority Territorialization in Kazakhstan

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Increased corporeal mobility, capital flows and communication between co-ethnic peoples across the globe are creating a new context for socio-spatial integration, citizenship, and belonging. This is perhaps nowhere more true than within and among the relatively new states of post Soviet Eurasia. In a region where strict state regulations once limited movement and contact between dispersed groups, growing links between new migrants, established minorities, and distant homelands significantly affect state efforts to set trajectories of assimilation and integration. Already struggling with Soviet nationality policy’s preservation of original ethnic identity and its territorial concentration of various ethnic communities within their states, the leaders of Central Asia are increasingly challenged by, what is for them, the new discursive reality of global transnationalism.

Many scholars conceive of transnationalism as forging a new era of socio-political consciousness - an era epitomized by the de-

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transnationalization of identity. In contrast to this view, recent works by other scholars emphasize a continual process of de- and re-territorialization among individuals and communities separated from their ‘ethno-national’ or ‘historic’ homelands. To better understand the process of nationalization and homeland construction, I will focus this essay on Kazakhstani state policies intended to reshape identity among non-titular peoples and the prospect of transnational linkages shaping Kazakhstani policy.

Why the Case Study of Kazakhstan?

Soviet nationality policy constituted a dichotomous process of merging (слияні) the diverse ethnic groups of the former Tsarist Empire into a Soviet people (советский народ), while simultaneously seeking to enable the flourishing (рассвет) of those same ethnic groups. It is, therefore, not surprising that the states emerging from the collapse of the USSR inherited the need to cultivate territorialized collective identities among their smaller but often no less diverse populations.

The first fifteen years of Kazakhstan’s independence has seen shared attributes of Russian/Soviet culture provide the relational ties between people. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the legitimacy of these ties is increasingly questioned. The stated desire of a

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5 President Nazarbayev has recently stated, “it is the Russian language which unites our nation [нации], all citizens of our country. This is the way things developed historically, and this is no one’s fault. We will need time in order for the Kazakh language to begin to fulfill this unifying role and this should not be rushed.” See Vystuplenie, N. “Nazarbayeva na II с"ezde rabotnikov obrazovaniia i nauki” Kazakhstan Pravda 13 Oct 2004.
largely Russophone elite to create an inclusive civic-nation by maintaining the status quo is currently countered by a group focused on developing Kazakh ethno-nationalism as the core bonding agent of the state.

In his analysis of policies enacted by the Kazakhstani government to influence the negotiation of identity among its multi-ethnic, multi-homeland population, Jørn Holm-Hansen asserts that the Nazarbayev regime is steadily advancing a policy of multiple re-ethnification. He argues that this policy stultifies the cross-ethnic, Russophone identity formed during the Soviet era in favor of recently reified ‘original’ ethnicities. Through this process, “the Kazakhstani power-holders deliberately miss the opportunity to create a common Kazakhstani identity beyond configurations of ethnicities.”

Instead, these leaders lay the groundwork for Kazakh hegemony by encouraging each group within the state to reconnect with their original ethnic culture and language. This occurs while minorities are steadfastly denied the opportunity to officially articulate that identity in Kazakhstan’s territory.

Such a policy raises the following questions: For whom is Kazakhstan a homeland? What is to be the nature of Kazakhstani citizenship? Will non-titular peoples commit themselves to a future as ‘Kazakhstanians’ or will trans-state flows of capital and information create primary identity networks linking dispersed ethnic communities to remote ethno-national kin-states?

The latter question generates from a growing pattern of ethno-territorial hybridity among Kazakhstan’s non-titular peoples. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, various ethnic communities of Kazakhstan demonstrated a capacity to form homeland conceptions that partially circumvent their state of residence. Referred to as “scale

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jumping,”7 the formation of such hybridized conceptions of belonging could readily problematize the formation of a “single, distinctive solidarity group” within Kazakhstan.8 The venues from which ‘scale jumping’ would likely occur are called ‘Areas of Compact Living’.

Originally serving as sites of organizational containment and, in some cases, confinement within the Soviet territorial administrative structure, “Areas of Compact Living” have evolved into micro-scale havens of ethno-cultural retention and/or reification for many groups in contemporary Kazakhstan.9 At present, one hundred ninety-five (195) “Areas of Compact Living” are considered worthy of identification by the Kazakhstani government’s Agency of Population Statistics.10 These areas have great potential to facilitate cultural and linguistic retention and, by consequence, may affect the territorialization of identity through an augmentation of transnationalism. The following sections explore how Kazakhstani identity policies combine with growing transnational contacts to leave the status of non-titular peoples and indeed the future social climate of Kazakhstan in question.

Transnationalism and the Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Identity Politics

As various ethnic communities (e.g. Germans, Jews, Koreans, Poles, and Turks) actively court foreign financial investments and solicit

9 Formerly known as “special settlements” and “ethnic-raions,” or “ethnic districts” - these areas are distinct from the larger, more politically complicated, autonomous regions existing in other former Soviet states (e.g. the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast in Uzbekistan).
textbooks and materials for language training from their remote kin-states, the Nazarbayev regime will be increasingly compelled to consider the diverse possibilities of their transnational contacts. This is particularly so for linkages that may problematize the penetrative power of the state government. An example of the double-edged nature of transnational contact relates to a community’s service as a “gateway” of economic benefit. Such a position may, over time, foment social networks that create additional boundaries within Kazakhstani society. Herein we confront the phenomenon of “scale jumping” in relation to areas of compact living.

Recent scholarship suggests that developing multi-faceted trans-state contacts (economic, cultural, political, etc.) has a great potential to result in minority groups identifying with their locality and the ethno-national kin-state with which the contacts are developing. Through this process, the state-scale of place within which the minority resides (Kazakhstan) has the potential to be at least partially “skipped” or “jumped” in terms of identity formation. By consequence, conceptions of loyalty and destiny (i.e. homeland) develop outside of a nested hierarchy of place capped by that residential state. I posit that this is especially true given Kazakhstan’s questionable legitimacy and the new relationships between formerly isolated Soviet minorities and their remote historical homelands. At present, the Kazakhstani government’s consideration of various components of its non-titular population serving as “middle-men” in relations with their respective kin-states does not appear to include the possibility that such conditions readily facilitate ‘scale jumping.’ As contacts between kin-states and pockets of co-ethnic

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11 See Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 6 November 1996.
13 “Various components of the non-titular community” refers to the simple fact that Germans, Koreans, Poles, and Turks have a greater likelihood to draw resources from sponsor states than do ethnic communities from the CIS (Ukrainians, Georgians, etc.) or groups without independent ‘kin-states’ (Kurds, Chechens, Uighurs).
concentration increase, I contend that the Nazarbayev regime will be forced to come to terms with the dichotomous prescription of identity and homeland conception inherent in the *multiple re-ethnification* model of nationalization and the social boundaries likely to result.

An example of a problem likely to emerge from this concentration on “original” ethnic identity and contact with remote kin-states is “neighboring group resentment.” This interactive social phenomenon is likely to manifest among those witnessing their neighbors’ receipt of various forms of material aid (often in the form of small business, educational, or housing support), as well as a growing awareness of the avoidance of military conscription among higher income ethnic groups.\(^\text{14}\)

We see what is happening. Many of the Germans that are staying get money from abroad. They use it to make better lives here. They make businesses and buy bigger apartments or better cars. Often their children may go to university in another country. Our children don’t have such options; oh there is *bolashok*, but for most the future is only here, in this economy, in this country.\(^\text{15}\)

A German interviewee relayed the gratitude with which funds from abroad are met.

We are very fortunate that the German government is willing to send money to help some of our people with businesses, or for

\(^{14}\) There may be some question with reference to the use of foreign funding to support ethnic schools. “The first thing the Poles do when there are more than ten in one place is try to start a Polish language school. They don’t send their kids to Kazakh language school; they take money from relatives in Poland or America and start their own school” (Author interview, Kazakh MP, Astana, October 2002). I could find little evidence of this use of the kin-state funding. William Fierman notes that “the number of pupils studying in languages other than Kazakh and Russian is under four percent.” See Fierman W. “Language and Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Kazakh-Medium Instruction in Urban Schools” *The Russian Review* v.65 n.1 2006 p.102.

\(^{15}\) Author’s interview with a Russian Shopkeeper, Karaganda, October 2002. The *bolashok* program to which the interviewee referred is a study-abroad-program for Kazakhstani students that currently requires families to provide collateral to ensure the return of the student for employment in Kazakhstan.
classes, or to get better places to live in the city. If we are to stay in Kazakhstan, such things are needed.16

While certainly acknowledging a shared ethnic bond, there is no doubt that the funds channeled to Germans of Kazakhstan (like those offered Koreans and other small minorities with benefactor states) represent the kin-state’s desire to stem the tide of future immigration. Nurlan Amrekulov, president of the Intellectual Resources of Stable Development Fund, explicitly conveys this very idea:

The funds that the Federal Republic of Germany spends to support developing countries could be spent to help the Germans in Kazakhstan, which could create conditions for them to develop businesses in Kazakhstan and to reduce their desire for emigration, thereby reflecting the interests of all three sides – Kazakhstan, Germany, and the ethnic Germans.17

Devoid of intensive transnational influence, many of these locally territorialized groups may have integrated into a nested hierarchy capped by the state-scale of homeland (Kazakhstani). However, with increasing transnational contact, they currently find themselves reconstituted as “diasporic” by the dualistic nationalization strategies emanating from both their ‘kin’ and ‘host’ states. As a consequence, these peoples have sought, and may continue to seek, to “split the difference” between their ethno-national kin-states and current state residence by petitioning for dual citizenship.

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Dual Citizenship and the Geography of Group Distinction

Through what has become known as the “zero option,” all of the Kazakh SSR’s permanent residents were afforded the opportunity to become citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991. In essence, the “zero option” refers to the “all-in or all-out” approach, where one had to accept Kazakhstani citizenship or that of another state, but could not accept both.18 A special exemption was originally planned to enable the ethnic Kazakhs migrating to their “historic homeland” to retain dual citizenship, but this option was short-lived. This titular-centric policy proved impossible to maintain, as it would have set a readily exploitable precedent for other groups.

A general prohibition of dual citizenship in the Republic of Kazakhstan was therefore implemented, but it has done little to dissuade Slavic Movements, such as LAD (Slavic Rebirth Movement), from regularly pushing for a reconsideration of the issue. LAD, in conjunction with other ethno-political groups, has argued that dual citizenship will facilitate greater economic integration between southern Russia and the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan.19

While not opposed to cultivating economically based trans-state links,20 many Kazakhstani elites fear that the population’s superficial understanding of citizenship and tenuous commitment to Kazakhstan’s civil society already renders the legitimacy of the state questionable. These elites contend that allowing an official policy of dual citizenship would irrevocably compromise the sovereignty of the state. Such fear

20 Most Kazakhstani political elites prefer such trans-border economic links to occur through the regional integration of the Eurasian Union or CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) rather than the provision of dual citizenship.
derives, in part, from the near pervasive association of ethnicity with a
primordial or historic homeland that has manifested in much of the
discourse surrounding this recurrent and troublesome issue.

For many non-titular citizens, dual citizenship symbolizes a
contingency plan for migration in the event of a dramatic downturn in
the economy or inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan.

It would be difficult for me to leave Kazakhstan. I opened my
eyes here. It is what I know. But if things go badly, I mean if
they force me to speak Kazakh or I cannot find work, I would
like to know I have a place to go. I mean, it only makes sense, I
am a Russian. I can live here but I should be able to live in
Russia if I choose. 21

Clearly individuals such as the one quoted above have yet to be
fully nationalized within a Kazakhstani civic model and re-territorialized
at the state-scale of an independent Kazakhstan. They are essentially
seeking to institutionally “keep the door open” to their historic homeland.

For many Russians, adding Russian citizenship to their Kazakhstani
citizenship would, at least partially, assuage the indignity that some
perceive as commensurate with their new status as a minority in the
republic over which they had ostensibly ruled.

Look at these buildings. Who do you think built these
buildings? Russians did. Before we came here, the Kazakhs
lived in tents. We made this place a modern country with the
roads and a railroad… they have control now but they cannot
rule this land. Even Nazarbayev knows this. 22

Herein one must acknowledge a tendency toward euro-centrism,
and its greater propensity to occur in Central Asia or the Caucasus than
in a region such as the Baltic. Anxiety relating to genuine or even
invented Russian irredentism targeting Kazakhstan’s northern oblasts 23

21 Author’s interview, Russian Iron Worker, Almaty, March 2002.
22 Author interview, Russian Employee of NGO, Almaty, March 2000.
23 Irredentist and secessionist sentiment targeting the northern Oblasts of Kazakhstan has,
however, been cited as a concern by Melvin, N. Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of
and the more generally perceived need to enhance state legitimacy dissuades the Nazarbayev regime from further consideration of dual citizenship.24

Such concern relating to transnationalism’s effect on the socio-political environment of Kazakhstan is publicly stated to reflect the Nazarbayev regime’s genuine interest in creating an inclusive, multi-ethnic, civic-national state. Compelling its population to conceive of and commit to a destiny within Kazakhstan is, however, dependent upon the cultivation of meaningful conceptions of citizenship and homeland. At present, the Nazarbayev regime seems intent on pursuing a strategy calling for the various communities comprising the population to vest themselves in the future of the state by reifying their original ethnicity and willingly abandoning ideas of territorial autonomy for their respective communities. Viewed through the theoretical lens provided by Monica Duffy-Toft’s recent work, such a strategy has the potential to contribute to Kazakh hegemony and could reduce the likelihood of ethnic tension.

**Projecting Transnationalism’s Effect**

In her book, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*,25 Toft presents a convincing case that a dispersed (not concentrated), increasingly urbanized minority is far less inclined to engage in ethnic violence than a group constituting a majority in a particular region of a state that it

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regards as ‘homeland’. Interestingly, Kazakhstan’s policies regarding the formation of a non-federal-unitary state, along with rising levels of urbanization, and the focus on reifying original ethno-cultural tradition would appear to embrace this theory as a strategy for (1) inhibiting ethno-geographic concentration, (2) extrapolating local or regional homeland conceptions to the state-scale, and (3) commensurately reducing the likelihood of collective Russophone activity in Kazakhstan.

Cengiz Surusu provides a textured discussion of the bifurcation of Kazakhstani public space, wherein Russophone intellectuals “were alienated from the state in favor of more ‘loyal’ nationalist figures.” The cosmopolitan opposition to ‘remedial’ Kazakh nationalism organized itself as a broad coalition called the Azamat Movement. Azamat articulated an internationalist, pro-democratic reformist platform in opposition to the increasingly ethno-nationalist discourse emanating from the government. This multi-ethnic cosmopolite elite have, however, been forced into what has been deemed the ‘new sector’. With limited access to the reigns of power through elected office or appointment within the government, the Russian-speaking, urban Kazakh and non-titular elite operate in what Surusu calls ‘a space between economy and politics.’

Having loose ties and complex relationships with both (the economy and politics), they lead numerous opposition parties,

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27 See Surusu ibid p.390; see also Ertybaev, E. “Problema ‘naatsionalnovo dialogo’ cherez prizmu sotsal’nopolitichesnovo konflicta” V.3 (31) 2000 pp.8-12.

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mushrooming NGO’s, research centers, private universities, local branches of international governmental and non-governmental organizations etc. In a sense they act as the local extensions of various international interest groups in Kazakhstan. They share an occupational interest to monitor and report practices of the political power, interethnic relations and a whole set of related issues, sometimes for domestic but mostly for international consumption.29

The ‘new sector’ and this group’s role within it effectively represent a marginalization from Kazakhstani power structures. This process is ironically also likely to derive from minority ‘scale-jumping.’

By encouraging the largely russified “small nationalities” to reify their original ethnic cultures and languages, while simultaneously promoting the embrace of “Kazakh” as the official language of their new state, the Russophone “concentrated majority” would potentially fracture. Kazakhs would theoretically embrace “Kazakh,” Koreans would theoretically embrace “Korean” and “Kazakh,” Germans would theoretically embrace “German” and “Kazakh,” etc. leaving the Russians and perhaps closely related and highly russified Slavic communities, such as the Ukrainians and Belarusians, as the only groups still reliant on Russian as the “language of international communication” (the legal status it currently holds in Kazakhstan today though the phrase has largely fallen into abeyance). While many of the Turkic language minorities will be able and perhaps willing to quickly adapt to a more pronounced Kazakh language domain, non-titular groups of European decent will likely seek languages of wider communication.30 Coupling English with a reified ethno-historic language will further cast these communities as transnationals and promote ‘scale-jumping’.

29 See Surusu op cit Ref 26, p.391.
30 Bhavna Dave points out that Turkic Muslim peoples now constitute 61 percent of the population of Kazakhstan and many of these peoples are willingly learning Kazakh. See Dave, B. op cit Ref p.440 and p.450. For discussion of the changing language domain of Kazakhstan see Fierman op cit Ref 13.
Viewed in this light, the *multiple re-ethnification* model is essentially a means of cultivating Kazakh hegemony in the Republic of Kazakhstan. As transnational networks increasingly tie dispersed ethnic communities to their remote ethno-national kin-states, those least comfortable with a “second among equals” status will be compelled to migrate. Those willing to accept this status and embrace Kazakhstan as a context for their individual, family, and community destiny will serve as “middlemen” or “gateway minorities” for various forms of transnational interaction. They may, however, never fully accede to a sense of Kazakhstani nationhood. As a result of this transnational role, they may remain Kazakhstani-Germans, Kazakhstani-Koreans, Kazakhstani-Poles, etc…viewing their locales of residence as micro-homelands linked economically, politically, and culturally to a remote kin-state. They will not become German-Kazakhstani, Korean Kazakhstani, etc… sublimating their ethnicity to a civic national identity and state scale homeland within which they reside. But how long will such a position be viable within Kazakhstani society?

“Third-state” involvement is cited in Toft’s case studies as potentially altering the ethnic violence equation and Shantha Heneyake identifies third state involvement with minority peoples as a catalyst of interactive ethno-nationalism. 31 Both argue that “third-state” involvement can alter the rationale for aggressive or violent courses of action, even among dispersed groups, due to their expectation of external support rendering a greater payoff for insurgence. This is far more likely among Russians and Uzbeks than Germans and Koreans due to the geographic proximity of kin-states. In 1994, 10,000 Russians in the provincial capital Ust-Kamenogorsk gathered to demand dual citizenship and official recognition of Russian as a government language equal to Kazakh and, in 2000, fourteen ethnic Russians were arrested for plotting to establish the “Russian Altai Republic.” 32 While kazakhization has


catalyzed resistance among virtually all non-titular peoples of the state (particularly those of European decent), William Fierman is correct in pointing out that President Nazarbayev “has been careful not to tilt too far in favor of Kazakh in any field, including education. True, in the past few years, Nazarbayev’s policies seem to be leaning toward greater kazakhization, but the president still seems keenly aware that many non-Kazakhs and Kazakhs alike oppose any extreme nationalism.”33

The President’s tendency has been to walk a fine line between appeasing the more aggressive nationalists in his cadre and maintaining an inclusive rhetoric for his non-titular citizenry and the international community. This is evident in his address delivered on 31 August 2004, in which he proclaimed a Kazakhstani (supra) nation was emerging. He declared this nation to be a free association of ethnic groups bound together in “cultural-political and social economic unity.”34 He was quick to also refer to the diversity of his population, thus signifying his apparent commitment to multiple re-ethnification. Therefore, Nazarbayev apparently remains committed to a strategy reminiscent of the Soviet nationality policy. He seeks to create a united Kazakhstani people and support the reification of original ethnicity. This strategy has failed in the region before (USSR). Given the likelihood of increased minority scale-jumping, what are the chances that this strategy will work in the future?

In most cases, diasporic communities provide remittances to their ethno-national kin-state. The opposite flow of support is, however, occurring among certain non-titular groups within Kazakhstan. This reversal of capital flow could take on a veneer of quasi-colonialism, in that the groups receiving help from abroad remain outside the national identity structure of the state. They will become increasingly ‘diasporic’ and may draw resentment from those perceiving them to be misusing their citizenship.

At present, however, such transnational links are not overtly feared by Kazakhstani political elites because of their belief that raion level concentrations of ethnic groups are too small to serve as platforms

33 See Fierman op cit Ref 14, p.112-113.
of centripetal political action. Dissipating ethnic concentration, often through increasing urbanization, is also considered to be reducing the likelihood of future ethnic territoriality. ‘Middleman Minorities’ have played a positive role in the development of many states but have also drawn the ire of governments when wealth differentials become conspicuous.35 Such complications arising from material advantages drawn from transnational links are, however, regarded by Kazakhstani elites as issues to be dealt with when and if they occur.

Conclusion

It is clear that the importance of ethno-national homelands among virtually all of Kazakhstan’s and, perhaps more broadly, the former Soviet Union’s non-titular communities increased with the independence of their respective Union Republics. I suggest that in combination with the new transnational discursive reality, the former Soviet territorial-administrative structure provides a legacy that may complicate territorialization of minority identity to the states of current residence. Even though no “Autonomous Oblasts” were delineated in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era, “ethnic raions,” or, as they are referred to today, “Areas of Compact Living,” serve as smaller-scale manifestations of this phenomenon.

While some regard modernization as a means of lessening ethnic tension, Chaimun Lee adroitly notes that it can also stimulate nationalism and previously forgotten parochial sentiments.36 Transnationalism, as I have presented it in this essay, is a product of modernization. It is likely to augment the process of “multiple re-ethnification,” which can be regarded as advancing the cause of Kazakh hegemony by fragmenting the Russophone community within Kazakhstan. By generating a sense of enhanced legitimacy among Kazakh elites, this process stands to catalyze two potentially distinct scenarios.

35 See the cases of Indians and Pakistanis in Uganda, Chinese in Indonesia, and Lebanese in West Africa.
36 See Lee op cit Ref 2, p.103.
In the first scenario - feeling the future of the state to be more secure, the Kazakh regime may enact greater tolerance of potential dualities of identity and homeland conception among the non-titular peoples of Kazakhstan. In this case, the dialectic of “us” and “them” is blurred and may translate to a social condition capable of enabling non-titular peoples to perceive Kazakhstan as a legitimate homeland.

By contrast, a second scenario points toward the lessening of governmental sensitivity to minority issues, as de facto ethno-nationalization conspicuously dons the cloak of a “civil society.” This institutionalization of a “second-among-equals” status for the non-titular population pushes the dialectic of “us” and “them” to the fore. A “host-state” social environment is constituted, wherein non-titular peoples have limited capacity to perceive Kazakhstan as homeland. As with so many topics relating to the region of Central Asia, this one requires further monitoring and research.