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Social Change and National Problem in Central Asia¹⁾

by

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Introduction

Since the independence of the Soviet Central Asian states in September 1991, there have been so many speculations over the future course the new independence states will follow. The most importance questions are : what system will they adopt and in which direction will they orient themselves?. These questions are directly related to the national identity of the states. What political and socio-economic system will replace the ex-communist regimes? In regard to foreign policy, which direction will they choose? They as religious Turkic Muslims had been so long repressed both under the Orthodox Christian Russian empire and the atheist Soviet regime.

On the other hand, after the breakdown of the Soviet regime, the Central Asian countries are accomplishing politico-economic transformation and nation-state building. As the transition to the market economy differs from each other, the mode of new tradition invention also differs in some respects in those countries. However, it is common that all the states is pursuing the de-russification policy in terms of new tradition invention or national identity. Soon after independence, the process of the nation state building was accelerated by new regimes of the Central Asian states, as national symbols such as flag, anthem, emblem was changed and new state symbols was created.

In this research, we would like to discuss the process of nation building, national identity problem and change of nation symbol in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan since the independence, after reviewing the process and philosophy of nationalist movement and countering policies of the Soviet regime since the Soviet era.

I. The Basmachi Resistance and Jadid Movement

After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Turkistan Autonomous Government(Qoqan Autonomy) was established, which was the second 20th century independent, indigenous state of Central Asia after Khiva earlier in the same year. Its premature death of the following year by the Soviet regime would transform a political style that had offered a peaceable environment for debate into severe resistance and conflict³⁾. When the Soviet regime exerted military intervention at Turkistan Government in Qoqan, there began an extended period of armed resistance to the Soviet Russians all over the region in Central Asia by Central Asia irregular forces led by warriors of Basmachis or Qorbashis. Despite the great threat by Russian troops, the Qorbashis' breaking the rule of nonviolence confounded the pacific expectations of Jadid leaders. As the Basmachis fought against the Bolshevik communist regime, their leaders evolved a new form of government in Turkistan. At the height of the Basmachi resistance in southern Turkistan, its leaders spoke of their fighters as müjahidler, warriors of the faith, and disseminated its political and religious aims to the people of the region⁴⁾.

The Basmachi program grew out of the second Qurultay of Turkistan Muslim, an extraordinary meeting of resistance leaders in Samarkand, April 15-20, 1922. The conference announced plans for a new entity that would include all Turkistan, embracing the south as well as Turkmenistan and Kazak Yetti Suw territory(Semirechie). For the future state, Turkistan Turk Mustaqil Islam Jomhoriyeti was proposed by these leaders, which embodied the Turkistan ideal of Central Asian unity.

However, though wishing the greater unified Turkistan state, Jadid or Reformist leaders could not welcome the cause of this resort to arms in Turkistan. The Jadids and Basmachis saw the dilemma of Turkistan differently and thus disagreed over how to overcome the Russians's brutal use of arms. According to this understanding, the Basmachis despised the Jadids as pro-Russian, while the Soviet regime accused the Jadids of supporting the Basmachis. Most of Jadid leaders strongly empathized with the general aim of liberation or independence of the Basmachis, but they worried about the Basmachis's specific motivations or ambitions of restoration of the Amirate, traditional muslim schooling,

and the like⁵⁾. Nonetheless, realizing the real plans of Bolsheviks, some Jadids joined the national liberation movement of the Basmachi resistance.

During the first decade of the Soviet rule, nearly all Jadid Movement activists were executed, including Munawwar-Qari, Abdulla Qadiri, Chulpon, Abdur Rauf Fitrat, Usmon Nosir, Tawallo, and many others.

In the end, Jadid movement was forced to be closed down by the Soviet regime. However, the movement gave birth to the awakening of national self-determination of Central Asian people, gave them modern education, and brought positive changes in their political thinking. It was due to the Jadids' efforts that there was a cultural renaissance in Central Asia. Even though Pan-Turkist ambition of Tatar nationalists and their followers has not been achieved, Jadidism was a real step culturally and psychologically to the national liberation of the Central Asian peoples. In the field of religion there many positive achievements, including modernization of attitudes, renovation of past practices, and the adaptation of Islam to modern conditions.

Generally speaking, the external expression of Jadids were rather mild. Their leaders mostly pretended to be loyal to the Soviet regime. Pan-Turkic propaganda by them was centered in the big medresses that prepared teachers and mullahs. The Jadid activities were carried out under guise of Islam, practice of which was allowed both in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. But at other times they were coated with Marxist theory, which sometimes led the authorities even to fear the peril of "Pan-Turkist Communism"⁶⁾.

II. The National Delimitation Policy of the Soviet Regime

Actually there were the decisive role of intra-elite politics both of Pan-nationalists and Islamists in the origin and maturation of the Central Asian states. In the post-Revolutionary Soviet Turkestan, Turar Ryskulov, supported by Muslims or Turkic native Communists, tried to create a supranational state based on the unity of the region's people. He and his associates sought to eliminate local differences in a larger Turkic identity and create a Communist Turkistan. Another native leader, Jadid reformer, is Sagdulla Tursun Khojaev who was a Social Revolutionary but

joined the Bolsheviks in March 1918. Both men were to play crucial roles in the rise of the Turkistan Muslim Bureau in middle of 1919. In January, S. Tursun Khojaev, an Uzbek elite, was chosen Secretary of the party's united Executive Regional Committee, while Ryskulov was then Chairman of the Turkistan Party Executive Committee. They had been lifted to the highest position as a native intellectual. Ryskulov, a Kazakh elite, unveiled his ambition at the January meeting of the Communist Party of Fifty Regional Congress; He proposed that A Turkic Republic should be recognized and the communist Party of Turkistan should be transformed into "Turkic Communist Party". However, his proposal was rejected by Frunze who just came from a victorious Transcaspian campaign. Henceforth, the Soviet Turkistan was to enter an tighter embrace with Moscow, and the Party's local branch had to accept oblast or provincial, rather than state level status.

In March 1920, the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee dispatched guidelines for future relations between Center and periphery. In the guidelines, they made clear that no real autonomy, and no territorial enlargement would be tolerated. Then Frunze removed Ryskulov and his associates in July. Eventually, he began to be suspicious of the Muslim Communists and skeptical as to the depth of their conversion to the Bolshevik ideology.

After this intervention, Moscow sought to subdivide Turkistan into Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kyrghyz(Kazak) units. However, the implementation of the national delimitation was delayed in the reign of Lenin who seemed to consider the plan untimely and ill prepared. Later in 1924-25, according to the Moscow scheme of state construction and nation building, the national delimitation policy was forcefully implemented, and the Turkistan ASSR was divided into several new units. As a result, there emerged Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as Union republics, an enlarged Kazakhstan, and Kyrghyz and Tajik units, which were one yet given Union Republic status. Kirgizia became part of the RSFSR and Tajikistan was to be an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR.

III. Language Policy and Formation of a Soviet People

In the creation of new languages and alphabets after 1921, the outcome conformed closely with Soviet political consideration. Soviet policy continued Tsarist efforts to russify Central Asians and stifle their cultural potential. Really the Soviet regime used Russian language instruction in its attempt not only to bridge the cultural geographic distance between the Soviet Union's Slavs and the Central Asian peoples, but also to russify intellectuals of Central Asia. This campaign reached its height during the Brezhnev rule, when Russian was routinely referred to as non-Russians' "second mother tongue". The policy which was first implemented in the late 1950s, accelerated into the mid-1980s until it was abandoned by the revolutionary reformation of Gorbachev.

This colonialization policy was justified on the grounds that it was the language of cross-nationality communication and that its mastery furthered "the strengthening of the political, economic, and spiritual unity of the Soviet people". As the Soviet linguist Mikhailovskaya put it, "Russian language promotes a single socialist culture of the new social and international community- the Soviet people"⁷. When Russian language teacher teach Russian to Central Asians, he could not simply teach a foreign language, rather he had to immerse the students into the Russian spiritual world, promoting thereby "a gradual sblizhenie and ultimately also the integration within the framework of a common socialist or Russian culture. In this case, Russian has to be understood as an strong instrument of acculturation or Russification policy.

IV. Transition to Capitalism and Social Change in the Post-Soviet Central Asian States.

1. Mono-culture of cotton and ecological and agricultural problems

After Central Asia was ruled by the Russian Empire, Russian capital stimulated the orientation of local farmers to wards cotton growing. The Russian bourgeoisie readily provided loans of money, grain, fabrics and tools, and thus determined the character of economic activity of the local peasantry at the turn of the century. In the pre-Soviet era, cotton

growing became the dominant economic activity in Central Asia, and under the Soviet rule cotton became the mono-culture in the densely populated areas of Central Asia.

Beginning in the 1930s, the Communist power used repressive command methods to enforce the mono-cultural status of cotton. On the other hand, the Soviet regime viewed cotton as a strategic resource and its production was financed generously. By huge investment loans from the Central Government's budget, in the 1960s and 1970s Uzbekistan became one of the world's biggest cotton producers and the owners of the largest irrigated area in the former Soviet Union.

On the other hand, in the beginning of cotton policy in 1930s, the former Jadid and later communist Faizullah Kohjaev resisted the cotton mono-culture being imposed by Moscow under the slogan "you cannot eat cotton". Kohjaev and the first secretary of the CPU, Akmal Ikramov, were accused of treason in the last Moscow treason trial before World War II. Kojaev was charged with trying to contact British agents in Tajikistan⁸⁾.

The cotton scandal was a direct result of the oversimplification of an idea by the central planners in Moscow. Under a command economy it was assumed that whatever the social, economic or ecological cost, cotton production would only rise and rise every year. Central Asia, and in particular Uzbekistan, was designated as a cotton producer and discouraged from growing anything else, even basic food crops. In the 1930s cultivation of rice was banned, grain had to be imported, and thousands of kilometers of irrigation channels were destroyed to create vast cotton fields where machine harvesters could operate.

Consequently, the forced growth of cotton production gave rise to unresolvable problems in the region's water balance system and brought it to the verge of an ecological catastrophe unprecedented in world history. Another result of cotton mono-culture is the destruction of agricultural production in the region. Uzbekistan, with its huge rural population, imports 80 per cent of all grain, 55 per cent of all meat and butter, and 100 per cent of the sugar it consumes.

The socio-economic perspective of the next few decades in Uzbekistan, the most populous country in Central Asia, is inseparably linked to farming and cotton. The volume of cotton produced will

inevitably decline until it reaches the amount the world market really needs. Until then, Uzbekistan will be chained to the Russian market and consequently to Russia.

2. Privatization and transformation of local societies

The traditional farming society of the Central Asian region can be divided into two zones. There are seen striking contrasts between them economically, socially, and politically, being two regional sub-civilizations.

The first zone covers Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and some parts of Uzbekistan to the west and north west of Tashkent. Traditional agriculture of Central Asia is more or less developing successfully in this new space with its ample area of underdeveloped land. The small scale commodity producers in this developing market economy are getting ever new impulses for their development. Society here is more mobile and involved in money relations, and life is acquiring a well-pronounced individualist colouring. The mahalla or peasant community is very alive, and people continue to honour traditions and worship Allah.

The second zone comprises the most fertile and most populous areas of Central Asia, covering the Ferghana valley in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Tajikistan's foothills and mountainous valleys. Here the cotton mono-culture has overrun the overwhelming part of the land and the region's agrarian diversity has been annihilated. Cotton occupies up to 90 per cent of all irrigated land.

Demographically this second zone was on the verge of social collapse at the beginning of the 1990s just after independence. In some parts of this zone population growth rate is double that of agriculture production. In 1940, each individual could claim about one quarter of a hectare of irrigated land.

Whereas in the first zone of central Asia, new families had a chance of beginning their own life independently by obtaining a plot of land and starting a small-holding of their own, in the second zone, the authorities, the mahalla and the parental authority, all back the indivisibility of privately owned land. This change, based on the complete indivisibility of

available farm land and on collective working of this land, regulates not only the economic but also the everyday life of local society.

In the first zone the availability of free space and the liberalization of market relations in the post-Soviet period has entailed a gradual transformation of all society, and the role which had been played by the community with all its ideological and cultural functions has been consistently narrowing. In the second zone the traditional sector is in deep crisis, and every community is consolidating to mobilize all its strength in order to survive.

V. National Identity Problem in the Post-Soviet Central Asian states

1. Pan-Turkic Nationalist Group

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pan-Turkism seemed to re-emerge for a time taking advantage of on-going de-russification movements of the Central Asian states. Pan-Turkism, however, gradually lost supporters from both inside and outside. Today, it does not gain enough support in Central Asia. It seems that this situation will continue for the time being. Followings are the reason, I think, that weakened Pan-Turkism movement in Central Asia:

First, the former Soviet regime which was afraid of Pan-Turkism or Turk nationalism boosted cultural peculiarity and individuality of each of the Central Asia states by implementing the policy of national delimitation, even though they were all of the same ethnic group, (i.e. Turks except Tajikistan). As the result of this long-term planned political scheme, community consciousness among the Central Asian states was remarkably weakened during the Soviet regime.

Second, all the regimes of the Central Asian states were occupied by the former communist elites who were educated in the direction of the Soviet ideology. Therefore, the current regimes did not want radical change and prohibited radical nationalists or Pan-Turkists from political activities, banning the activities of the radical nationalist parties. These former communists seemed to set up their countries on the foundation of their own nationalism (e.g., Uzbek nationalism, Kazakh nationalism, and so on), with keeping the idea of Pan-Turkism in mind for the long run.

<Table 1> How do you think of the opinion that Uzbeks are of Turkic ?

- I. Uzbeks are of Turkic, for Uzbeks, Turkish, Kazakhs, Turkmens are all considered ethnically Turkic people.
- II. Kazakhs and Turkmens may be of Turkic, but Uzbeks are not of Turkic origin.
- III. Turkish, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and Uzbeks are all of ethnically different origin.
- IV. Beyond my knowledge.

Response	I	II	III	IV
Percentage(100%)	40.3%	0.7%	34.2%	24.8%

Above figure is a result of questionnaire conducted in Uzbekistan recent years after independence. As is seen in the table, nearly 40% of respondents preferred number I, despite of 70 years education of the Soviet regime against the Pan-Turkic concept.

This result is contrary to our expectation when considering both that there were troubles among Turkic ethnic groups, i.e., between Meskhetes and Uzbeks, Uzbeks and Kyrghyzs, and that many Central Asians have longed for the Soviet time because of serious economic difficulties. From this result, we can see the table that supporters of Pan-Turkic dream can increase if the situation changes.

<Figure 2> Response according to the educational preparations.

Response	I	II	III	IV
Lower educated	57.1%	0%	28.6%	14.3%
Higher educated	20.5%	0%	45.2%	34.2%

This figure shows that there is a considerable gap between the lower educated and the higher educated. In the less educated stratum, the Pan-Turkic ideology tends to be seen more stronger than the other one. Of the higher educated respondents, 34.2% expresses very prudently; "I don't know it well". This hints that many intellectuals do not still make their position about the Pan-Turkic idea clear.

It seems that now in the Central Asian Turkic states there is no room for radical Pan-Turkic ideology. After dependence, the states are pursuing policies on the basis of nationalism emphasizing their own national identities of each states without neglecting Pan-Turkic Nationalism. Each government has being nation-widely promoted the understanding of its own culture and history in the course of official education since their independence. In case of Uzbekistan, historical heros such as Timur, Ulug Beg, Alisher Navoi have being newly introduced and dramatized as national heros.

2. Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia

Islamic political powers in Central Asia are divided into two group: the national islamic group whose activities are limited within their own country, and the Pan-Central Asian group which has influence on the entire Central Asian region. The latter was organized with the name of 'Islamic Revival Party' in all the Central Asian Turkic states except Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the Islamic party is to establish an Islamic State on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism. This group has been opposed by other parties which adhered to the state ideology of secularism. The Islamic party currently restricted by the governments of Central Asia

After the independence, Islamic political group won large supporters from the lower class, by appealing to the religious feelings. They used the simple logic of 'Just as the Russians are returning to their own religion, so we must return to ours', reminding people of religious revival movements in Russia. In fact, as for the Central Asian people having different religious background, i.e., Islam, it was nature to come back to their inherent religion. This Islamic political group has being received some financial support from Iran and Saudi Arabian government, and Turkish Islamic powers. But in the last few years, their activities were greatly weakened due to the restriction of political activities imposed by the current governments being afraid of extreme fundamentalism.

Uzbekistan is the most Islamic state in Central Asia, comparatively. But for the time being, Uzbekistan has almost no

possibility of becoming an Islamic state as those in the Middle East. Starting with Uzbekistan, every regime in Central Asia wants not radical but moderate and traditional Islam, and cooperating closely with each other in order to prevent both Islamic fundamentalists and radical Pan-Turkists from having significant political influence. They believe that Islam need to remain a personal religion, and that state must be established on the foundation of secularism and democracy.

However, it seems that supporters of Islam fundamentalism will be gradually increasing in the near future if the current economic difficulties continued some more years. Such trends can also be seen in surveys as shown below.

<Table 3> Between a state which allows multiple or single religion, which one do you think is better?

Response	Multiple Religion	Single Religion	No Comment
Percentage (100%)	43.6%	53.7%	2.7%

As seen by the table above, it is quite remarkable to note that 53.7% preferred a state with a single religion, in the circumstances that Islam fundamentalism is prohibited by the current governments. Also considering the fact that the surveyees were of the former Soviet Government in which it was dangerous to express thoughts contrary to the government, the actual number of those favoring a state with single religion – even though they all do not want a state based on Islam fundamentalism – is presumed to be higher than 53.7%. Considering the trend in Turkey, where below 7% of the nation's population supported Islamic political party in the 80's had grown to 23% two years ago (largest support since the founding of the republic), the possibility that the influence of Islamic power will increase in Central Asia cannot be ruled out.

Since the fall of the former Soviet Union until today, hundreds of mosques were reconstructed and Islamic schools raised in Central Asia under the support of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Islamic states in the Middle East are sending out short and long term workers and clerks for Islam propaganda, and they are enjoying good success among the lower class

of Central Asian people. Such revival movements are done not as a cooperative work between Saudi Arabia and Iran but under competition. Saudi Arabia does not want the Shia sect of Iran to spread in Central Asia. As for Iran, their Islamic fundamentalist movement with Shia characteristics was severely weakened in the Middle East after the defeat by Iraq, which was supported by the Sunni sect of the Arab. Since then, they are putting full effort to increase their influence in Turkic states such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and etc., taking advantage of the volatile situation in Central Asia. As for Iran, Central Asia may be the last place for Iran to have a stake at world influence.

But, Iran did not give enough financial support that to Central Asia at the degree that they expected. For Iran, with its limited economic resources, the only way to increase Islamic fundamentalist groups in Central Asia where presidents of communist background prevail is through public movements. Such approach seemed to have success in Tazjikistan but returned to nothing due to the intervention of CIS army.

On the other hand, internally, there were severe conflicts between those who favor Islamists and Pro-Turkic nationalism on the issue of language reformation. Pro-Turkic nationalists favored Roman alphabets from which Turkish alphabet was modified, Islamists wanted Arabic writing, and pro-Russians wanted to continue using Cyrillic alphabet., the alphabet used today. The leaders in power, who knew that the anti-Russian feelings prevails in their countries, felt the need earlier for new alphabet in stead of Cyrillic. But they were not able to make a decision solely because of political reasons in relation to their own national identity.

After all, between 1992-1994, most states decided to adopt Roman alphabet like Turkish and English, but they could not able to implement due to economic difficulty (except for Azerbaijan). The fact that Roman alphabet was chosen over Cyrillic or Arab writing reflects the leaderships' intent to establish a state based on Turkic nationalism. However, the people are still debating over this along with other political issues. The result of Survey taken in Uzbekistan, the most conservative and Islamic nation in Central Asia, shows the following:

<Table 4> Which writing do you prefer as the national writing?

Favored alphabet	Turkish alphabet	Roman /English alph.	Cyrillic	Arabic	Etc.
Percentage	6.8%	56.1%	16.2%	12.8%	6.8%

As shown in the table 7, 62.9% of the respondents favored Turkish or Roman(English) alphabets. Uzbekistan is aiming for complete elimination of Cyrillic alphabet by year 2005 and using Latin(Roman) alphabet in all schools by year 2000. Situation in Kazakhstan is quite different. Since almost half of the people are Russian, it is difficult to eliminate Cyrillic at once.

3. Diversification of Foreign Policy

Geo-economically and mutually dependent economic system as intentionally organized since Stalin has united all related states except the three Baltic states and Georgia under another structure called CIS. But such structure was temporal, and upon economic independence, it was understood that the structure would completely collapse.

Under such conditions as all states of CIS, the Central Asian states also have made efforts to find economic partners. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states(except Tajikistan) found Turkey, the heir of Osman empire and a fellow Turk. Just because Turkey is not able to offer much economic aid at the present time, it cannot turn away completely. Because if their economic difficulties continue, Islamic powers will increase and will result in increase of Iran's influence in Central Asia.

But Turkey has not met the expectations of the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has ignored Turkey and is making efforts to establish direct relations with the U.S. and Russia. Such policy change is not only a result of the failure of Turkish economical contribution to the states. After Turkey had given up on Azerbaijan after losing to the Russian, Azerbaijan somehow shifted from pro-Turkish policy to Pro-Russian policy, and the Central Asian Turkic states witnessed the limitation of Turkish influence in the international arena. Such trend is seen by the fact that Kazakhstan agreed with the basic principles of Russian proposal in April, 1996 to form a kind of state confederacy.

Uzbekistan is faced with similar situations. Survey taken from the Uzbekistan people shows that the most favored economic cooperative partner is CIS. Russia was also available as a choice, but CIS was favored, I think, because of the concern for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other Central Asian countries. Considering that the largest foreign company activities in Uzbekistan is a Korean company, Daewoo, it is an interesting phenomenon that only 2.0% chose Korea as their economic partner. It reflects that Daewoo's entrance is negatively viewed by the local people as a move for its own benefit and does not contribute to the growth of Uzbek's economy.

<Table 5> Select an economic cooperative partner which can contribute most to Uzbekistan's economic development

Favored State	CIS	EU	Iran	Pakistan	Turkey	Russia	China	Japan	U.S.A	Korea	Etc
100%	27.0%	6.8%	0%	1.4%	17.6%	17.6%	7.4%	4.1%	12.8%	1.4%	2.0%

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and others, while planning close economic cooperative relations with Russia, are actively seeking cooperation with the western U.S. and EU. Uzbekistan while increasing economic relations with Russia, are also looking for increase in relations with Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and Pakistan. Under such circumstances, the Pan-Turkic nationalists movement, based on Pan-Turkish nationalist ideology relating whole Turkic world including Turkey which was seen just after the collapse of the former Soviet Republic, had almost vanished. In stead, individual nationalism of each states, which is moderate based on national feeling and religious feelings, had begun to take place. Such trend as mentioned above, was greatly influenced by official nationalism movement pursued by each government in Central Asia after the independence. Such transfer to contextual pragmatism weakened anti-Russian sentiment that was prevalent just after the fall of the former Soviet Republic and de-Russification trend. As a result, this trend allowed the Central Asian states to adopt pragmatic approach and diversification foreign policy.

Such change of atmosphere can also be seen in Uzbekistan. The current government lead by Islam Karimov is considering relations with

Russia more important. Uzbekistan government is hoping to form a closer economic cooperation by changing from subordinate relationship of the past to an equal partnership. Among the Central Asian States, the state with most anti-Russian nationalistic ideology traditionally was Uzbekistan. Despite this reason, President Karimov, in the middle of his term, controlled anti-Russian feelings from surfacing, despite receiving criticism from both Pan-Turkic nationalists and Islamists. Now he is working for close cooperative relation with Russia for political stabilization and economic development. Even the mass public who once favored Islamic or nationalist power, due to their religious and nationalistic feelings are showing increasing support for Karimov's Pragmatism.

Such phenomenon can also be seen through a survey of 149 people recently conducted by the author of this paper. Among the Central Asian people, nationalism is still dominant, but faced with the real issue of economic difficulty, those who long for the days under the former USSR are increasing.

<Table 6> What is your opinion on the timeliness of Uzbekistan's independence?

Response	timely	too early	too late	against independence
Percentage(100%)	29.5%	4.7%	42.3%	23.5%

The Results above are seen easily in the former Russia and Eastern Europe in such transitional period where the people are struggling between choosing bread over nationalism. But, Central Asian people do not want to revert to the old system. Such can be detected easily through deep interview with the locals. For Central Asians to return to the Soviet rule and to live as second citizens is beyond conception. Many Central Asian people live in irony as they rejoice over their independence from the former USSR, at the same time, missing the better life under the Soviet rule.

VI. Nation-State Building and State Symbol : Revival or Invention of History in Uzbekistan

Although generally, the nation of Uzbeks has been formed from 16th century⁹⁾. they have not been experienced a nation-state. They were conquered by Russian in 1850s, and totally incorporated into USSR in 1925. As is mentioned above, the 'national' communities of the Central Asia have been declared artificial creations of the Soviet regime, as opposed to the more natural sub-national localized ethnic groups and supra-national Turkic and Muslim communities. Broadly speaking, there were three ethnic "cards" the Central Asians could put into play in the international arena. These are their Turkic nationality expect Tajikistan, their Islamic religion and their "Asianness"¹⁰⁾. Russian elements were added to them. It is difficult to identify what is national. New invention of national tradition means dual tasks, to find out and to take off. Invention is not representation and fabrication. When the political elites invent some new national tradition, they have to think over what is sustainable tradition, and to make political ritual to incorporate all classes and ethnic groups¹¹⁾. That is institutionalized by new national holidays, heroes and symbols.

New invention of tradition after independence could be traced to the Jadid movement, but that process is more reflected by contemporary political horizon including the reinterpretation of history and the reconstruction of the past. So it is important to understand the background of political elites.

Anderson focused the importance of national symbols to understand the modern nation-state as an imagined community¹²⁾. National symbols are composed of flag, anthem, emblem. Russia has been suffering from strong conflict about new state symbols.¹³⁾

2. Change of state symbol

1) Reinterpretation and invention of historical tradition

It is a sensitive issue how to evaluate the history of Uzbeks under the Soviet system. President Karimov defined the past social system as the imperial totalitarian regime, and sometimes as the colonial regime in the speech at the sixth session of the Oily Majlis, August 1996. He explained the accomplishments after the independence in the political,

economic, social cultural sphere. On the democratic change in the social cultural sphere, Karimov indicates first that all conditions are created to revive national culture and morality, second that the principles of social justice are being established, third that family is strengthening both in financial and social aspects¹⁴⁾. Among them, we focus on the revival of national culture.

“There opens the historical memory of the people, there comes spiritual enlightenment and along with it the feelings of national pride and love for one's Motherland stir up anew.

One of the major achievement of Uzbekistan Independence is the fact that the nation, the people were given back the memory of great sons of the Uzbek people such as Al Beruni, Ibn Sino, Moukhamad Khorezmi, Akhmad Fargoni, Al Bukhori, At-Termizi, Amir Temur, Mirzo Ulughbeg, Hodja Bakhouddin Nakhshband, Alisher Navoi, Babur Mirzo and hundreds of others.

Great concern is shown today for restoration of famous names of the sons of the Uzbek people belonging to our recent history—the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the 20s–30s of this century in particular. They were undeservedly forgotten, calumniated and annihilated under colonial, ideologized and totalitarian regime.

What can one measure with what has been done by us for the revival of national customs and traditions, spiritual, cultural, and moral values, revival of religion, desecrated faith of our ancestors, for returning to people their sacred places and objects—restoration of mosques, madrasahs and other historical monuments¹⁵⁾."

It is a fundamental base of the Uzbekistan nationalism that Karimov defines the former social system as colonial regime. In the present political climate, individuals are generally extremely cautious in voicing their views about political issues, except in a very broad and oblique manner. Shahrani described it as 'muffled voices' related with colonial consciousness¹⁶⁾. Many intellectuals criticised the heritage of Russian rule.¹⁷⁾ But there is another view that the modernization of Uzbekistan was started under the soviet system. Sometimes the minority ethnic group would agree with the strength of soviet system in national policy.

After independence, Uzbekistan government tried to reconstruct the national identity through the mobilization of formal scholars and institutes

and the manipulation of mass media. One major results of nation building project was a recovering of two heroes, Amir Timur and Navoi. Even though they were referred in the text old times, they could reborn as national heroes. Especially the rebirth of Timur is perhaps related the indirect project of making power of contemporary elite groups. The Image of Timur usually is overlapped by that of President Karimov in the golden news time. The making national hero of Timur represents a dream of Uzbekistan, the reconstruction of strong central Asia. In that context, there is a wish to get the hegemony of the other Central Asian countries. There was a ceremonial ritual of 660th years of Timur in Samarkand, seven presidents of the Central Asian states were invited including Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The Image of Timur should be balanced by the image of cultural hero, as Navoi. He was a famous poet 17-18th century. His poetry is written by Arabic, but it represents the Uzbekistan sentiments excellently, so it is very suitable to national appeal.

As the President Karimov said, the project of finding out the root of nation sometimes goes beyond the period of nation formation. Especially Some scholars, who worked in the early expansion period of Islam 9th-12th century, would be a good sources of cultural nationalism.

The Identity politics in the multinational state presents with a various and complex form. The past suppressing the nation building should be negated. The history of Russian revolution is erasing in the Central Asia.

Language and religion would be good indices of Uzbekistan. Alternation of ruling language and formal religion are important factors in the nation-state building. Uzbekistan is accomplishing the policy of nation building, but cannot accept an radical nationalistic policy. He needs some voluntary participation and mobilization of minority group. So he should suppress the trend of radical nationalism and extreme Islamism. In that terms, he can not emphasize the ethnic unity. The against minority means not only a rapid break from past but also an obstacle for the economic restoration.

2) State symbol and collective memory

Modern nation-state always makes some political signs symbolizing of new established political community, like national flag, national anthem, and state emblem.

Some western countries have modelled the French flag¹⁸⁾. The custom of national flag worship had been developed in U.S. in 1880s through the rapid expansion of elementary education system¹⁹⁾. Under the soviet regime, Russia and the other satellite countries accepted a series of the Red flag.

The new national flag of Uzbekistan established in 1991 is a symbol of state sovereignty. It is a right-angled coloured cloth consisting of three horizontal strips: blue, white and green. The blue in the upper means peace, and the crescent moon and twelve stars means Islam and provinces respectively. The middle part is white, symbolizing the color of Uzbekistan cloth. The low part is green, symbolizing the prosperity. The crescent moon and star as an Islamic sign is presented in the Turkic national flag as a prototype. Bird and sun, presented in the national flag of Kazakhstan is in the state emblem. The state emblem of Uzbekistan presents the image of the raising sun over the flourishing valley surrounded by a garland compound of the wheat ears from the right side and branches of cotton with opened cotton bolls from the left side. The eight angled star is placed in the upper of the emblem symbolizing the unity and confirmation of the republic. The crescent and star are the sacred symbols of the Moslems. The legendary bird Semurg with the stretched wings is placed in the center as the symbol of the national Renaissance. The entire composition aims on expression of the desire of the Uzbek people for peace, happiness and prosperity²⁰⁾. Pan-Turkistic Islamism is represented in the national flag, and ethnic myth is represented in the state emblem as Kazakhstan.

The old national anthem of Uzbekistan was made 1924. Its tune have not changed, but the words of it have displaced by the poem written by Aripov 1994.

The change of national symbol is based on the reinterpretation of history, reproduced various forms. National holidays, national cemetery, national museum have played roles to reproduce the reinterpreted public memory and history.

Uzbekistan made a new holiday system including New year's day(1.1), International Woman's day(3.8), National holiday Navruz(3.21), Moslem holiday Khait, Victory day(5.9), Moslem holiday Kurban Khait, Independence day(9.1), Constitution day(12.8). The conspicuous change is that Moslem holidays become to have more weights.

The public memory also has been changed. The old museum has been changed and new museum has been constructed. The name of Lenin Museum that was the core of old museums, has been changed to the History Museum, and Amir Temur Museum has been constructed. The exhibition of museum also has been changed. First, the portrait of Lenin was displaced by the painting symbolizing of modern history of Uzbekistan, in which the portrait of president is placed around the center. Second, Uzbekistan socialists were displaced by the nationalist group against October Revolution or soviet regime. Third, exceptionally, famous general, Lahimov who fought to the Nazi in the World War II, was exhibited continually.

Even though there are some museums presenting the national identity, for example celebrating the famous poet Gullyap or autobiograph writer Ivek, but after independence, the national identity is more emphasized.

In case of nomadic nations, it is difficult to construct the national museum because of lack of documentary sources. They realized the importance of oral sources and archaeological results to recover national tradition. The archaeological evidences are generally treated as core sources to construct the cultural territory and the concept of ancestors^{[21\)](#)}.

3. Change of landscape and monument

Urban and rural landscape interacts collective memory of history. Power and collective unconsciousness is carved in the square, street, park and more directly statue. In the capital city, there are more symbolic monuments representing the unity of nation-state. Questioning whether or not the socialist city is fundamentally different from the city in capitalist societies, French & Hamilton insist that there are significant differences in the geography of towns, not only between 'socialism' and 'capitalism'^{[22\)](#)}, but also between various socialist countries for good historical, social, economic, and even political reasons(1979:4).

Throughout the socialist period theories have been propounded about the role of the town and how this should be reflected in its form and appearance.

There are significant differences in the structure and landscape between the various socialist countries for good historical, social, economic, even political reasons²³⁾. The first principle of urban design in socialist countries was the premise that all citizens should have equal access with minimal outlays of journey time and effort whether on foot or by public transport²⁴⁾. One of the earliest ideal forms was the linear city. This was conceptualized by Milyutin for the planned city growth in the late 1920s. The early theoretical ideas of the ideal socialist city culminated in the 'micro-district' of Strumlin.

The sharing of the theoretical concepts and actual planning strategies by planners in the various socialist countries, and the similar problems of applying theory into practice, have brought about a certain degree of uniformity in cities throughout the Soviet Union. The differences between cities is mainly of central areas where the historical, cultural and religious differences remain most strikingly apparent. There are many resemblances in the architecture and street structure. The heroic statutory, the white-on-red slogans, the central square as a ceremonial focus, the kiosk selling newspapers, or the 'kivas' vending machine²⁵⁾.

The landscape of Tashkent as the capital city is more international than other cities. Tashkent has been constructed a kind of showcase of socialist development. Tashkent was a Islamic-oriental city like Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand. Bukhara presents structural and functional elements typical of an Islamic-oriental town of the Iran-Turanic region. Giese indicated these are the Friday Mosque, the Bazaar, the Citadel, the cell and blind-alley structure of housing quarters with their interdependence of family bond as well as ethnic, religious, and corporational relationships, and the compact wall with its town gates, enclosing the town compound and separating it from the rural environment²⁶⁾.

With the expansion of Russia into the Turan lowland, those cities were subjected to changes in the course of occupation and colonization. Tashkent was connected by the Transcaspian Railway 1899. The October Revolution marked the beginning of profound changes in the structure

and function of cities. Instead of traditional religions, Marxism-Leninism serves as a substitute as expressed by the multitude of Lenin portrayals posted everywhere in the town; monumental sculptures alternate with pictures on walls, banners, carpets, and flower beds²⁷. With the destruction of the elements of the Islamic town, New elements of city planning replaced them. Visual expression of the need for representation and self-assertion of Soviet regime and Communist Party are the large Central Square, named Red or Lenin square, the wide Main Street, the Prospect and representative building as well as conspicuous administrative offices in dominating positions(Giese,1979:157). Parts of the Russian colonial town of Tashkent were destroyed by earthquake in 1966.

After independence, so many spaces representing soviet power have changed. Red square, enlarged 1977, celebrating 60th anniversary of Revolution, has changed to Independence square. The names of main streets, named Lenin street and Engels street have changed to Rashidov, famous Uzbekistan politician and poet, and Temur street respectively. But Pushikin and Navoi street have not changed. Generally the names of space relating the Revolution and Russia, except cultural heroes, have been displaced by Uzbekistan heroes.

The most conspicuous monument was the Lenin statue in the soviet culture. It was reproduced in various forms and has been in the center of the city and town. After independence that statue was destroyed 1991, like Marx and Engels statues. The name and content of monuments has been changed. The Lenin statue was displaced by Independence tower. But the spatial arrangement of monuments has been continued as before.

This politics of symbol is carried through rural area. The phase of rural kolkhoz was a powerful source which show the superiority of soviet regime. Generally the kolkhoz market is set up around a large market-hall with solid stalls. It would be a space of political propaganda. Decorations of Kolkhoz always were products of formal symbol politics. Name, decoration, and political picture of kolkhoz have changed to more nationalistic.

VII. Conclusion

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the important questions was whether the new sovereignty should have been expressed region-wide, on the basis of common ethno-linguistic identity and Islamic culture and religion, or through the republics into which the region Asia was divided in 1924 after the independent Turkistan Republic. Most signs seem to point in the direction of the latter, with the republics hot in pursuit of their particular interests.

From the fear of the Central Asian unity, the Soviet regime launched the contradictory Soviet policies of 1921 to 1924 in religion, nativization, state demarcation, and language policy²⁸⁾. The Soviet regime created a very complicated system of interlocking political, economic, and inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia. The newly independence states of Central Asia were parts of this highly artificial and unbalanced web of state relations. This area still artificially unites many peoples. Social and political relations that should take a natural shape would need a long time to emerge.

Due to this successful policy of the Soviet regime, many Jadid nationalists who had longed for the Greater Turkistan lost its strength and shifted ideologically from Pan-Turkic nationalist movement into each ethnic enlightenment movement, emphasizing each ethnic identity or national consciousness.

This each ethnic national consciousness which had been fostered by the Soviet Jadid leaders leads the current leadership of the Central Asian states to be determined to build a nation state, not on the basis of Pan-Turkism, but their own particular ethnic nationalism,

Political leaderships of the Central Asia eventually is giving way to particular each ethnic nationalism in a dialectical sequence far away from the dream of Jadid nationalists in the pre-Soviet period.

In this circumstance, the political leading groups of Central Asian states are collecting the sources of political legitimacy and is 'inventing' the tradition of new state in the basis of each ethnic nationalism since independence. National flags, national anthems, state emblems have been changed. Monuments and symbols in urban and rural area have been displaced or constructed. It is a big burden for political elites group because they have not only to find national elements, but also to take off

the traces of Russian rule. There are some obstacles in the process of the nation-state building because the ruling groups came from the communist party under the soviet system and the multinational composition in this country.

One of the most peculiar trends is that the contents of formal symbol have changed from Russian to Central Asian elements, but the arrangement of monuments have not changed. Such a symbolic politics reflects the dual faces of the nation state building process. It is more easy to establish the national identity than to get the national legitimacy for power bloc. The change would be characterized by a transition from state socialism to national authoritarianism²⁹⁾.

However, because Pan-Turkism which connects Turkey, Kafkaz, Volga River area and Central Asia and Uygur area in China is not visualized in Central Asia today, we cannot be certain it will remain status quo in the 21st century. As Samuel Huntington claimed, given that nationalistic, religious solidarity increase, Turkey and Central Asia which has the same religion, culture and language has great change for confederation. It is difficult to predict who will assume leadership in such Turkic confederation, whether it will be Turkey or other Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. The summit conference between Turkey and the Central Asian Turkic states is becoming regular. Such summit conference demonstrate not only existence of the Pan-Turkic world but also the Pan-Turkic dream. The summit also clarify their will of independence, opposing both Pan-Slavism or Russian nationalism with their strong military forces and Iran nationalism with its religious

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