# Peoples' Choice or Export of Revolution? Mechanisms of Transition from Monarchy to Socialism in the Early 20th Century Inner Asia

## Sergius L. Kuzmin

Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

**Abstract:** Transformations of the monarchies of Khiva, Bukhara, Mongolia and Tibet into socialist systems in the early 20th Century are analyzed. Despite differences between these states, there were significant similarities in their social systems and mechanisms of further transformations. There were no internal prerequisites for revolutions, and the changes took place by the export of revolution from abroad.

**Keywords:** Khiva – Xorazm – Bukhara – Mongolia – Tibet – Russia – China – Communists – Bolsheviks – Revolution – Monarchy

In the early 20th Century some countries of Inner Asia underwent revolutionary transition from monarchies to republics<sup>1</sup>. The Xinhai revolution of 1911–1912 and two Russian revolutions (February and October) of 1917 may be considered as starting points for these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Below the term 'revolution' is used for illegitimate fundamental change in political and socio-economic system of a country within a short time frame.

events. Main essence of the Xinhai revolution was overthrow of feudal system and the establishment of republic. European revolutionary ideas, combined with Chinese (Han) nationalism, provided the basis of this revolution. Two Russian revolutions in 1917 have important similarities with it: elimination of the monarchy, breaking of feudal relations, establishment of the republic, relying mainly on relatively modern European ideologies of that time. Later, one of these ideologies, Marxism-Leninism will become ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC) which seized power in China in 1949 with decisive support of the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) (AUCP(b)).

After revolutions in the Qing and Russian empires, monarchies were abolished also in the countries dependent on them: Khiva, Bukhara, Outer Mongolia and Tibet. Outer Mongolia and Tibet were Buddhist theocratic monarchies. Bukhara, as the Emirate, considered Sharia as the basis of its legislation. The influence of Islam was also strong in Khiva. These countries declared independence, but later socialism was established there, and all but Mongolia lost their independence. To elucidate mechanisms of these transformations, it is reasonable analyze archival documents (partly published), memories and studies in this area (Khojaev, 1932; Ishanov, 1955, 1967, 1969; Mukhammedberdyev, 1959; Nepesov, 1962; Ling, 1964; Abdullaev, 2009; Eleutov Inoyatov, 1963, 1964; Babakhojaev et al., 1967; Iskandarov, 1970; Vais and Inoyatov, 1976; Zimanov, 1976; Pogorelsky, 1984; Goldstein, 1992, 2007, 2014; Medvedev, 1992a, b; Savin, 1994; Genis 1999, 2000, 2001; Pershits, 1999; Shakya, 1999; Shakabpa, 2003; Kuzmin, 2004, 2010, 2016; Morozova, 2009; Kudryavtsev et al., 2008; Bazarov, 2012; Kudukhov, 2012a; Kuzmin and Oyuunchimeg, 2015).

## Khiva (Xorazm)

In 1873, the Khan of Khiva recognized himself vassal to the Russian Emperor. But this had almost no effect on the internal situation in his country: it remained feudal, with Islam as the official religion (Mukhammedberdyev, 1959, p. 24-40). Common people were under strong influence of "their" feudal lords and mullahs. They had patriarchal, tribal, national and religious mood prevailed over the class mood (Nepesov 1962, p. 69). People were accustomed to "see in the face of the Khan and higher clergy a kind of unquestioned semi-divine authority" (Zimanov 1976, p. 126). At the same time, cases of arbitrariness caused discontent. The strife between the Turkmens and Uzbeks, mainly associated with the competition for water, was typical (Nepesov 1962, p. 39-43; Zimanov 1976, p. 70-72). There were also unrests in connection with feudal factions opposing the Khan, and the Turkmen nobility played an important role in many of them. The largest uprisings occurred in 1912-1913 and 1915-1916 (Mukhammedberdyev 1959, p. 43-45).

In the late 19th – early 20th centuries the Jadid movement was spread among Russian Muslims. It was a movement for reformation and drive to progress under the influence of European and Turkish political ideas (Ismailov and Bazarbaev 2013, p. 44-51). After the Russian revolution of 1905-1906, an Uzbek party was established in Khiva, who called themselves the Khivan Jadids and from the end of 1917 Young Khivans. In the early period they claimed only modest reforms.

In 1917, the Provisional and then the Soviet governments of Russia recognized independence of the Khanate of Khiva. After the February Revolution of 1917, the Young Khivans decided to ask help from Russian troops to overthrow the Khan, but the head of the Russian garrison promised assistance only for the establishment of constitutional monarchy. Then the Khan signed a Manifesto on some transformations of the state apparatus and establishment of the interim committee for

observation of the highest dignitaries (Pogorelsky 1984, p. 63-67). A parliament was created, which included the Young Khivans and aristocracy. Inefficiency of the new system and fall of authority of the Young Khivans led to their removal from parliament in June 1917 and arrest of their leaders. Meanwhile, revolutionary ideas continued their spreading mainly among European settlers. In 1918, Soviet power was established in the Russian Turkestan. The Turkestanian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed as a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

On October 1, 1918, the Khan of Khiva Asfandiar was killed by the people of Junaid Khan, the leader of Yomut Turkmens. On 3 October, Asfandiar's brother Abdullah was proclaimed the Khan. He became a puppet to Junaid. The latter began to pursue aggressive policy, profitable mostly for the Yomuts and unprofitable for the majority of Uzbeks (Eleutov and Inoyatov 1964, p. 487-488). He tried to start a military expansion outside the khanate. Economic situation deteriorated. His rule aroused dissatisfaction of not only Uzbeks but also a part of the Turkmen nobility.

There were Soviet and Party organs in Petro-Aleksandrovsk Town (now Turtkul), mainly among the European population. The Committee of Young Khivans was established. It created a conspiratorial cell in the city of Khiva. In the early 1919, the Khiva Communist group was established, which gave rise to the Communist Party of Xorazm. It was supervised by communist authority bodies in Tatarian Autonomous Republic of Russia with the help of Bukharan Communist émigrés (Mukhammedberdyev 1959, p. 66-95; Nepesov 1962, p. 153-155). They persuaded a part of Turkmen leaders to overthrow Junaid. Detachments of the Khiva refugees were created. In November 1919, the uprising of a part of the Turkmen chiefs against Junaid started in the Khanate of Khiva. On November 20, 1919, leadership of the Soviet Turkestan and the Central Committee (CC) of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

(RCP(b)) appointed a new representative of RSFSR to Khiva Khanate, who was tasked to provide military aid to the people of Khiva (Eleutov and Inoyatov 1964, p. 493-495). Soviet Red Army together with the Khivan troops by early February 1920 defeated Junaid. The representative of Bolsheviks convinced Abdullah Khan to sign the Manifesto announcing voluntary abdication, transferring the power to provisional government (revolutionary committee) and convening a "national majlis" (assembly).

The representation of RSFSR became actual power in Khiva. However, according to a witness, the Uzbek population "cannot imagine to dispense without the khan at the condition that this khan would be their Uzbek and not Turkmen, and that just this support is expected from our troops" (Genis 2000, p. 6-7). The entry of the Red Army to Khiva was followed by widespread looting and violence by Red soldiers (Genis 1993, p. 39 to 53, 2000, p. 10-11).

On 8 February Revolutionary Committee of the Young Khivans issued proclamation "to the workers and peasants of the RSFSR" calling for help "for liberation of the proletariat and the poor of Khiva from the oppression of their khans and beks". On the same day, a manifesto was issued, which set as goals the destruction of monarchy, nationalization of assets of the khan, feudal lords and ministers (Eleutov and Inoyatov 1964, p. 497-499). On May 28, 1920, the 1st Party Conference of Khiva was opened which elected the CC of the Xorazm Communist Party. By the summer of 1920, the number of its members reached 600, with 22 Party cells. Under the leadership of communists Soviet authorities on sites were established. Power passed into the hands of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee. On April 27, 1920, in the 1st Xorazm Kurultai (congress) proclaimed the Xorazm People's Soviet Republic (XPSR). On 30 April the Constitution was adopted. Private ownership of land and tools of production and system of the Sharia court were temporarily preserved. Only high aristocrats were deprived of voting rights. On September 13, 1920, the Treaty of Alliance between XPSR and RSFSR was signed, according to which RSFSR recognized the independence of XPSR (Mukhammedberdyev 1959, p. 100-245; Nepesov 1962, p. 169-170; text of the Treaty, p. Eleutov and Inoyatov 1964, p. 535-541; Vais and Inoyatov 1976, p. 7, 41-46).

On July 1923, the 3rd Congress of the Xorazm Communist Party put forward the program of struggle for socialism. In October of the same year the 4th All-Xorazm Congress of Soviets proclaimed Xorazm Soviet Socialist Republic (XSSR) and adopted new Constitution which fixed the end of the people's democratic stage and the transition to the stage of socialist revolution. In 1924, national-territorial delimitation began in Central Asia. Former multinational units (Khiva, Bukhara and Turkestan) were divided by ethnic criterion between new republics. XSSR was divided between Uzbek SSR, Turkmen SSR, and Karakalpak Autonomous Region of RSFSR (O Natsionalnom Razmezhevanii..., 1934, p. 1-34; Nepesov 1962, p. 188, 296-312).

Establishment of the Red power caused intensive struggle of the Basmachi, military and political guerrilla movement of local people. In July 1920, there was unrest in Khiva itself, and one of the slogans was to transfer authority to the successor of Abdullah Khan. The protesters were dispersed by military force. By the decree of the Council of People's Nazirs (ministers) Abdullah Khan, his closest relatives and dignitaries were evicted from Khiva to RSFSR, p. they represented the "center" around which counter-revolutionaries could be grouped. Soon in Khiva were massacred Turkmen chiefs who participated in the revolution. With support of the Young Khivans the Red Army began to disarm Turkmens, which resulted in their rebellion overlapped with the Uzbek-Turkmen discord and fights with the Basmachi (Genis 2000, p. 18-24). Transformation of Xorazm into socialist republic and its sovietization caused new uprising in 1924 (Nepesov 1962, p. 264-265, 285-292).

#### Bukhara

The Emir of Bukhara recognized himself a vassal to the Russian Emperor in 1868. Since then, dependence of his country from Russia increased. Railroad to Russia was built, a number of settlements appeared. However, social system, traditionalism and loyalty to Islam were preserved. According to documents, people of the Emirate were ready to endure any oppression, only if it came from a devout government, and the Emir's power was perceived as legitimate (Abdullaev 2009, p. 178). At the same time, cases of arbitrariness from the Emir and his officials caused dissatisfaction and complaints to Russia; there were local uprisings against injustices (Ishanov 1955, p. 20-23; Iskandarov 1970, p. 25-26; Zimanov 1976, p. 38-46, 59-70). Stability in the Emirate was ensured by Russian troops stationed there (Zimanov 1976, p. 21). Russian governments, which have come to power after the February and October revolutions of 1917, recognized the independence of the Emirate of Bukhara.

Like in the Khanate of Khiva, movement of Young Bukharans was emerged after the Russian revolution of 1905-1906 on the basis of the Jadid movement. It included people who passed the Russian school and often visited Russian Turkestan; others lived in the cities of Central Russia during years, some visited Bukhara only occasionally (RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 31, l. 11-12; Chirkin 2006, p. 274). Representatives of the Russian Provisional Government in Bukhara engaged in the development of the reform project, discussed it with the Emir and members of elite, as well as with the Russian Foreign Ministry. The main provisions were limited to a broad local self-government, universal education, improving finances, elimination of death penalty etc. (Ishanov 1969, p. 110-112; Babakhojaev et al. 1967: 44).

After the February Revolution of 1917, in the Russian settlement of New Bukhara (now Kagan) the Soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies was elected, and the 1st Congress of representatives of Russian settlements in the Emirate convened. By December 1917, Soviet power was established in the cities with predominantly Russian workers' population, p. Kerki, Termez and New Bukhara. Young Bukharans intensified their activity. Their left wing advocated overthrow of the Emir and establishment of the republic. On April 7, 1917, the Emir Alim Khan unveiled Manifesto on the reform of governance. On 8 April Young Bukharans organized demonstration. However, the demonstrators were met by a crowd of thousands, consisted mostly of the students of madrasahs, who forced demonstrators to disperse. The next day peasants from surrounding villages began to gather in the city to prevent the coup. Only introduction of a Russian military detachment provided pacification. Emir subjected Young Bukharans to repression, and most of them fled to New Bukhara (RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 31, l. 14; Khojaev 1934; Ishanov 1969, p.101, 108-116; Babakhojaev et al. 1967, p. 43, 52; Zimanov 1976, p. 106-111; Medvedev 1992b, p. 143).

After the October Revolution of 1917, the Turkestanian Council of People's Commissars recognized the independence of Bukhara. On 15 December in New Bukhara all power was taken by the Congress of Soviets, which elected the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian population of Bukhara. Emir rejected proposal on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Turkestan, began to strengthen borders and contacted Russian White Guards. Young Bukharans came into contact with the Soviet authorities. Their goal was to create a "united front" of revolutionaries from Bukhara and Soviet Russia against the Emirate. They asked for weapons and aid for uprising (Khojaev 1932; Ishanov 1969, p. 120-122).

F.I. Kolesov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, arrived to New Bukhara. He promised weapons and troops to the Young Bukharans. The CC of the Party of Young Bukharans formed there Revolutionary Committee headed by F. Khojaev. It enlisted a group of 200 people. In the March 1918, a small detachment of the Red

Army soldiers, headed by Kolesov, arrived there by railway. Kolesov, having believed to Young Bukharans, counted on the mass revolutionary rebellion and on the weakness of Emir's troops. However, the latter were stronger than the Reds. Kolesov under attacks evacuated his detachment and Europeans from New Bukhara (Ishanov 1969, p. 122-133). This campaign resulted in the death of more than 10 thousand people and destruction of all Russian settlements along railway by the people of Bukhara (Medvedev 1992b, p. 149-151; Genis 1993, p. 39-53).

On March 25, 1918, peace treaty was signed between Bukhara and Soviet Turkestan. However, in the capital of Emirate Young Bukharans and their supporters were massacred by both authorities and "crowds". About 8 thousand people emigrated. In the summer of 1918, the Left Young Bukharans in exile convened a meeting. Majority voted for the adoption of the RCP(b) Programme and establishment of the Bukharan Party of Communists-Bolsheviks (BCP), others adopted the program of a part of the Russian Left Esers and created the Party of Revolutionary Young Bukharans (later its members moved to the platform of Bolsheviks). Both groups agreed on the need of establishment Soviet system in Bukhara. By the beginning of 1919, branches of the BCP (supported by the Communist Party of Turkestan) and the Revolutionary Young Bukharans Party, existed in several cities of the Soviet Turkestan, clandestine cells in several cities of the Emirate. In February – July 1919, under the influence of communist propaganda, uprisings started in 6 cities of the Emirate, but they were suppressed (Khodzhaev 1932; Babakhojaev et al. 1967, p. 90-93, 116-117; Ishanov 1967, p. 15, 1969, p. 134-138; Zimanov 1976, p. 144-145).

The Emir tried not to disturb peace with the Soviet Turkestan and RSFSR. Apparently, he was hoping "to be able to do business with whichever group finally came out on top in Russia, unless he could escape from Russia's orbit entirely, which was highly desirable but never seemed likely to prove feasible" (Becker 2004, p. 214). The Government

of Bukhara led military preparations, almost unsuccessfully sought help from the British, the Afghans and the Russian White Guards. Islamic clergy called people for the Holy war against the Reds. In his Memorandum to the League of Nations on April 15, 1929, the Emir wrote that Bukhara at the Russian Tsar's Government did not need its own army and military equipment, but after revolution appropriate measures had to be taken (Iskandarov 1970, p. 53, 82-114). These were not aggressive but defensive measures.

In 1919, the 2nd and the 3rd BCP congresses held in the Soviet City of Tashkent. In November 1919, Tashkent was visited by the commission of CC RCP(b), All-Russia Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Comissars of RSFSR on the affairs of Turkestan. Their goal was transformation of Turkestan into a model republic in the Soviet East and the "aid to the oppressed masses of Bukhara and Khiva" (Ishanov 1969, p. 148-159). In the early 1920s, in the Soviet cities of Charjou, New Bukhara, Termez, Samarkand and Kerki Red detachments of Bukharan communists and their sympathizers were formed. Revolution in Bukhara was prepared also by the Party of Revolutionary Young Bukharans headed by F. Khojaev (Khojaev 1932). The leadership of Soviet Turkestan had growing opinion on the necessity of speeding up revolution in Bukhara with the help of Red Army. However, on May 18, 1920, G.V. Chicherin, the RSFSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, warned Lenin about undesirability of military speeding up of revolution in Bukhara, and called the precedent of Khiva "bad model" for such action (Genis 1993, p. 39 to 53). Nevertheless, on May 21, 1920, L.M. Karakhan, Chicherin's deputy, wrote to Lenin that Bukhara is the center of reaction and anti-Soviet activities among Muslims, and it is necessary "to eliminate the Emir and to form a democratic republic in Bukhara". The Politbureau of CC RCP(b) fully endorsed this (Ishanov 1969, p. 164-165; Genis 1993, p. 39-53). In the summer of 1920, the Turkestanian Commission formed Revolutionary-Military Bureau and

the Party Center for management of revolution in Bukhara by the Bolsheviks and Young Bukharans.

Emergency meeting of the Revolutionary-Military Bureau held on July 30. By its results M.V. Frunze, Commander-en-chief of the Turkestanian Front of Red Army, stated: "It was found necessary to solve the problem of the Government of Bukhara... to do this, the moment is most suitable" (Genis 2001, p. 27). On the next day, July 31, Frunze sent Lenin from Tashkent a telegram which recommended the "organization of revolution by the direct involvement of our forces" (RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1., 14884, l. 1-2). Frunze was based on bad experience of organization uprisings among local people. The Politbureau was aware that dekhans (peasants) is a "mass with dark, ignorant, and fatalistic mood", which cannot be directed to revolution. Under influence of the clergy agitation lot of the peasants flocked to Bukhara. Their militancy was hardly restrained by the Emir (Genis 1993, p. 39 to 53, 2001, p. 25-28).

Directive of the Politburo CC RCP(b) on August 10, 1920, recommended to the Bukharan Communists conducting a broad propaganda among population and creation of revolutionary centres in several large cities. The joint meeting of Turkestanian Commission, CC BCP and the Central Bureau of Revolutionary Young Bukharans decided to create a provisional revolutionary government of Bukhara, which was to be dominated by the Bukharan Communists. On August 11, 1920, the Politburo CC RCP(b) sent to Tashkent a telegram recommending not to take the initiative of attacking Bukhara: this could be done only at the presence of more or less popular Bukharan revolutionary center. In accord with this, the 4th Congress of BCP on 16-18 August 1920 adopted the programme of revolutionary government, declared the need for establishment of Soviet power, declared war to the Emir and appealed RSFSR for military assistance. New members of the Turkestanian Commission, having arrived to Tashkent on 23 August,

unanimously decided to military support the uprising of Bukharan Communists and Young Bukharans by military force (Khojaev 1932; Babakhojaev et al. 1967, p. 129-131; Ishanov 1969, p. 5, 180-186; Genis 1993, p. 39-53).

On August 23, 1920, Young Bukharans and Bukharan Communists launched a rebellion in the district of Charjou. On 28 August Frunze ordered "to come for the aid to the Bukhara people with all our military power" (Ishanov 1967, p. 33). The Emir later wrote in his memoirs that the war was not declared and the attack was sudden (Medvedev 1992b, p. 169-176). The first attack on the capital city was repulsed, as recalled Frunze, "due to energetic resistance from the Emir's troops and revealed falsity of the statements by Bukharan revolutionaries about alleged willingness of the population to revolt" (Genis 2001, p. 35-37; description of the fighting by RGASPI document: Savin 1994, p. 39-48). On 1-2 September Bukhara was captured by assault, after which the Reds ransacked the city. Artillery and air bombardment of the fortress, residential districts and mosques was crucial to success of the assault (RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1., 1600, p. 3-4rev.; Savin 1994, p. 47; Abdullaev 2009, p. 166-167; Genis 2001, p. 40-53, 87). Revolutionary Committee entered Bukhara and formed new government. On October 6, 1920, All-Bukharan Congress proclaimed the formation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic. On March 4, 1921, Provisional Military and Political Agreement between RSFSR and BNR was signed. It stated, in particular, "Complete unanimity in the policies of both Republics" (RGASPI, f. 79, op. 1, d. 175, l. 1-2).

Emir Alim Khan, having gone to the south-east of the Emirate, retained control of that territory during certain time. To regain power in Bukhara, he tried to get help from Basmachi and unsuccessfully sought assistance from England and Afghanistan. In April 1921, under pressure of the Reds, he went to Kabul, where he remained in exile until his death in 1944. Extensive Basmachi movement occurred over the Emirate

territory. In the early 1922 more than 20 thousand people were involved in the movement risen under the slogan "Down with Communists and Jadids" (Khojaev 1932; Genis, 2001, p. 54-56). The Reds launched repressions. As a result, in the 1920s, 200 thousand people fled from Tajikistan to Afghanistan, which was about 25% of the Tajikistan population. In 1925 amnesty was granted to "ordinary Basmachi of the labour origin", "explanatory work" was carried out, and gratuitous loans were given. This led to re-emigration of about 60 thousand people. However, by 1929, new emigration began due to collectivization of peasants (Medvedev 1992a, p. 127; Abdullaev 2009, p. 246-261).

## Mongolia

In the 17th–18th centuries, the lands of Mongols were included mainly in the Qing Empire. In particular, Outer Mongolia (now the State of Mongolia) became vassal to Qing emperors. In 1911 it declared independence as theocratic monarchy. Head of the Buddhist Church in Outer Mongolia, the 8th Bogd Gegeen Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was enthroned the Great Khan. The collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912 gave Mongols new basis for declaration of independence: China and Mongolia were two separate parts of the Qing Empire and the Mongols were subjects of the Manchu emperors and not China.

In 1912, Russia and Mongolia signed the Agreement under which Mongolia was recognized as an independent state, according to Mongolian text, or autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, according to the Russian text. In 1915, the tripartite Kyakhta Agreement between Russia, China and Outer Mongolia was signed. It unambiguously recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of China. But Outer Mongolia remained de facto independent state. In 1919 China, in violation of the Kyakhta Agreement, cancelled the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and Chinese troops invaded the country. In 1921, Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg defeated them, restored the

monarchy and de facto independence of the country (see details: Kuzmin 2016).

The Mongolian People's Party (MPP, later Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, MPRP), which later has come to power, was formed from two underground circles of the Mongols in the capital city of Niislel Khuree in 1919. These circles, which included people from clergy, officials and nobles, aimed at expelling Chinese invaders. They acted with the Bogd Gegeen's approval and were far from Red ideology. However, some of them showed interest to modernization of the society in European manner. Realizing that their own forces are not enough for national liberation, they sought support from outside. Some of their members tried to establish contacts with Russian colony in Niislel Khuree. Leadership in this colony in the late 1919 – early 1920 came under the control of pro-bolshevist forces. In early 1920s the Mongolian circles established contact with these forces, which accustomed them with communist ideology.

It is believed that on June 25, 1920, at the joint meeting these circles merged into MPP. This meeting, apparently, was attended by members of Russian Revolutionary Committee (Roshchin 1999, p. 29). Declaration was adopted, which set the goal of returning Mongolia's lost rights, expulsion of the enemy of religion and nation (i.e. the Chinese invaders), elevation of the authority and religion, observing human rights etc. (MUUTA, MBT, f. 1, d. 1, kh.n. 3, tal 1). In 1920, MPP delegates visited RSFSR. To legitimize their mission, they succeeded in obtaining the "Letter of appeal to the Commissioner of the Russian Government from princes and monks of Outer Mongolia" sealed by the 8th Bogd Gegeen. There was request for assistance in restoration of the autonomy and monarchy of the Bogd Gegeen. Upon their arrival to Siberia, under the influence of Bolsheviks, the delegates stated that they reject the letter of the princes and lamas and have their own program. At one of meetings they declared that the Bogd Gegeen will be retained only for the first

time for "decorum", and with the deepening of the people's revolutionary authority he will be "removed". A new document appeared, called the "Notes", where restoration of the autonomy "independently of princes and lamas of Outer Mongolia" was declared as the goal (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 4, l. 24, 25).

Bolsheviks responded to the letter sealed by the Bogd Gegeen with sharp refusal. Members of the delegation came to Moscow with another letter, on behalf of the MPP, written with account of the "Notes" and negotiations in Siberia (Roshchin 1999, p. 33). In this letter, they proposed to overthrow the Chinese power, to proclaim the Bogd Gegeen constitutional monarch, to abolish hereditary power of princes, to promote people's revolutionary ideas among masses, to distribute European culture and thus to prepare the basis for final demolition of existing system with the help of RSFSR, and to create in Niislel Khuree permanent central organ of the Party (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 3, l. 2–4rev.).

Back in Troitskosavsk Town in the Soviet buffer Far Eastern Republic (FER), the delegates started organizational and propaganda work. It was dangerous to them acting inside Mongolia due to the arrival of Ungern's troops. "For funding the whole of Mongolian revolutionary work", Bolsheviks created a special fund of 300 thousand roubles (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 154, d. 105, l. 12). At the beginning of 1921, MPP consisted of only 150 people, in the same year it reached 164, by May 1923 – 1700, by 1924 – 4 thousand (AVPRF, f. Rezidentura po Mongolii, op. 5, folder 107a, no 4, l 310-311; RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 51, l. 31; Shirendyb 1960, p. 587, 662). A group of Buryat national democrats arrived to Mongolia from RSFSR in 1920-1921 for "help".

On March 1-3, 1921, a meeting was held which later announced the 1st MPP Congress, in the house of O.I. Makstenek, the head of RSFSR Consulate in Kyakhta Settlement (the FER). It was attended by 26 people, including those from Buryatia. They approved Party platform

reflecting the desire to unite all Mongols into a single state, liberation from Chinese occupation, establishment of people's power and elimination of "useless and obsolete" institutions. Principal author of the platform was Buryat democrat Ts. Jamtsarano. MPP entered the Comintern as a sympathetic organization. The point of MPP propaganda, like that of RCP(b), was aimed at the "liberation" of Mongolia from Ungern, whom Bolsheviks declared acting for the interests of Japan (details in Kuzmin, 2016).

On 11 March, B.Z. Shumyatsky, the Chairman of the FER Council of Ministers and the Secretary of RCP(b) Far Eastern Bureau, passed to S.S. Borisov (who oversaw the MPP from the Far Eastern Secretariat of Comintern) the requirement from the Centre and the Secretariat to accelerate the establishment of Mongolian revolutionary government (AVPRF, f. 3, op. 2, p. 103, d. 28, l. 86 – in Pershin 1999, p. 181). In response, on 13 March the settlement of Kyakhta hosted a meeting of MPP representatives. They formed provisional government. At the request of MPP, Buryat national democrat E.-D. Rinchino became its representative (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 14, l. 7). Representatives of the Comintern called Red Mongols to accelerate the capture of Maimacheng Settlement on the Mongolian territory near Kyakhta (Belov 2003, p. 92-93; documents in the Appendix to the book: Pershin 1999, p. 181-183). Accordingly, on 17-18 March 1921, the troops of MPP and FER expelled the Chinese from Maimacheng. Mongolian Provisional Government moved there from the FER. Its control spread to a small part of Northern Mongolia.

Ungern invaded Siberia, which gave Bolsheviks a reason for introduction of their troops into Mongolia. The Red Guards were ordered to take nothing from the Mongols and use only those supplies that were brought from Russia and FER. Apparently, Bolsheviks took into account the experience of revolutions in Khiva and Bukhara, where the Reds plundered local population.

On 2 July the Bogd Gegeen issued a decree urging the MPP troops to lay down their arms. The monarchic government urged Red troops not to enter Niislel Khuree (Kuzmin 2016). However, revolutionary troops entered there on July 6-8, 1921. Now there were two governments, monarchic and provisional. On July 10, 1921, the CC MPP decided to form Central People's Government and proclaim the Bogd Gegeen limited monarch. On the same day the Bogd Gegeen's Government resigned. By the end of 1921, the troops of Bolsheviks and Red Mongols managed to take control of Outer Mongolia. On November 1, 1921, the people's government of Mongolia at its 21st meeting adopted a provision known as the "Oath Treaty". By this document the Bogd Gegeen was deprived of the right of influencing important state decisions. It was a unilateral act of MPP: no copy certified by the Bogd Gegeen is known (Kuzmin 2016, p. 241-242). On November 5, 1921, an agreement was signed between RSFSR and Mongolia. The governments recognized each other as the only legitimate power in their countries (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 11, l. 66-67).

Until the death of the 8th Bogd Gegen, the MPP pursued a policy of steady dismantling the theocratic system. At the same time, there was a growth in the number and budget of the Party, as well as creation of its new structures. However, MPP and its government still appealed to the religion and authority of the Bogd Khan: the Party influence on sites was weaker than the influence of theocracy. Revolutionaries needed a "unified front" with theocrats.

The 8th Bogd Gegeen died on May 20, 1924. On June 3, 1924, Plenum of the Bureau of CC MPP (including its foreign member E.-D. Rinchino) unanimously decided to establish the republican system in Mongolia (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 29, l. 202). In November 1924, the 1st Great People's Khural proclaimed Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). But it was only a formality: all important state acts were conducted by CC MPP decisions (RGASPI, f.495, op.152, d. 24, l. 45-

46). On 26 November the State Great Khural (Congress) unanimously adopted the Constitution. Its project was drawn up by P.V. Vsesvyatsky, Soviet lawyer and adviser to the Mongolian Government.

In 1921, soon after MPP had come to power, a conspiracy appeared for restoration of the Bogd Gegeen's absolute monarchy. In 1922-1926 there were few other conspiracies. In addition, after his death, numerous attempts were made to find his reincarnation. These attempts were suppressed under various pretexts: MPP and Bolsheviks understood the danger to their power.

Comintern inspired the "left deviation" aimed at speeding up socialist reforms in 1929-1932. As a result, the number of conspiracies and uprisings became greatest. By that time among the Mongols appeared a split never existed before: members of the Youth Revolutionary Union (analogue of the Soviet Youth Communist Union) and many activists were zealous in the desecration and destruction of religious objects, anti-religious propaganda etc. Several uprisings of lamas in the west of Mongolia were severely suppressed (Kuzmin 2015a, p. 53-59). There was a large-scale migration of people abroad to Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.

In April 1932 the largest rebellion in the modern history of Mongolia has started and then developed into civil war. It covered a significant part of North-western Mongolia and represented a real threat to the MPP rule. Rebels aimed to restore the Bogd Gegeen power, to stop persecution of religion, and return to the old system. Most of the rebels were simple herders; most of their leaders were lamas. There is evidence that about 70% population of the five most populated aimags (provinces) of Mongolia participated in the rebellion, and 8-10 thousand people perished (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 2., 221, l. 4-71 – in Bazarov, pt. 2, 2012, p. 401). The victory of governmental forces was due to the Soviet support by weapons, ammunition, equipment and direct involvement of Soviet instructors, who were in the government and in all departments of the

Mongolian Defense Ministry. In addition, an important contribution was made by the cessation of the "left deviation" prescribed by decisions of the Politbureau CC AUCP(b) on May 16, 1932. They decided that the MPR is "people's revolutionary democratic bourgeois republic of the new type". This spirit is clear in the joint resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee and the CC AUCP(b) on 29 May, which was sent to the CC MPRP. The 3rd extraordinary plenum of the CC and the Central Control Commission of MPRP on 29-30 June and the 17th extraordinary session of the MPR Small Khural on 2 July adopted a decision in full accordance with these instructions. The rebellion was finally suppressed to October and November (see details: Kuzmin and Oyuunchimeg 2015).

Then was a brief period of weakening of pressure on the church from authorities. After 1934, the pressure began to increase in connection with the building of socialism, and by 1940, all monasteries were closed, almost all destroyed, a significant part of the clergy repressed. These actions were accompanied by massive rallies and propaganda.

#### **Tibet**

In the 17th Century Tibet was integrated under the authority of the 5th Dalai Lama and has become theocratic monarchy. In the 18th Century it became dependent to the Manchu emperors. The 13th Dalai Lama in the early 20th Century emphasized that there are no documents proving vassal subjection or conquest of Tibet by these emperors. Known Tibetan, Chinese and Manchu documents show the signs of its dependence to the Qing Empire or Chinese and Western ideologems formed by the early 20th Century (see Kuzmin, 2010, 2015, p. 148-157; Dmitriev and Kuzmin 2012, p. 5-19, 2014, p. 5-17). After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912, the Dalai Lama issued declaration of independence. In 1913 Tibet and Mongolia signed the Treaty on mutual

recognition as independent monarchic states headed by the Dalai Lama and the Bogd Gegeen, respectively. At that time, the Russian-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 still operated, whose Mongolian text asserted the independent status of Mongolia. Therefore, having entered the Treaty with Mongolia in 1913, Tibet became independent state not only de facto but also de jure (Kuzmin 2015, p. 148-157). However, based on political expediency, world powers did not recognize independence of Tibet.

Monarchic statehood in Tibet persisted until 1950s, longer than in other countries under consideration. In contrast to them, Tibet had no influential groups aimed at change of its social system. First contacts of Tibetans with the Chinese communists refer to 1930s, when the Chinese Red Army entered Sikan, the province created by the Chinese in the Kham region earlier alienated from Tibet. The Red military command began to create county and district Soviet "governments", to form groups for struggle with landowners, to seize land and transfer it to peasants. In May 1936 in Kardze the 1st Congress of people's representatives has held. It was chaired by the Chinese Commander-in-chief Zhu De. Congress formed the "Tibetan Autonomous Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic" headed by Geda Lama. Some poor Tibetans joined the CPC and its army (Shakya 1999, p. 33). After the Chinese Red army left this area, these "government" ceased to exist.

In the mid-1940s in Nanjing, Tibetans P. Wangyal and N. Kesang created a small communist youth group, and then the Communist Party of Tibet (Shakya, 2005). This Party, which had no influence, unsuccessfully tried to unite Tibetans, to get help from the Tibetan Government for struggle against the Kuomintang (KMT) in Sikan and to attract "progressive" Tibetans for modernization and reforms. It contacted Soviet Embassy, members of communist parties of China and India. Wangyal wanted to get help from the Chinese for "liberation from backwardness" his country. He believed the government in Lhasa

ineffective. In 1949, the Communist Party of Tibet became a part of the CPC.

By the end of the 1940s, the CPC started to overcome the KMT in the Chinese civil war due to the Soviet aid. Lhasa began to fear that the KMT mission in Tibet could become a beachhead for China; it was said that communist propaganda was staged (Shakya 1999, p. 7-9; Shakabpa 2003). Therefore, in July 1949 the mission was deported together with all Chinese and those Tibetans who were suspected of sympathizing with communists, including Wangyal.

On September 2, 1949, the Xinhua Agency broadcasted that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) will liberate the whole of China, including Tibet. The Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. Within a month, the 10th Panchen Lama, who was then only 10 years old, has sent a congratulatory message from the Qinghai Province (formerly Amdo or Kukunor) to Mao Zedong and Zhu De and stated the following: "One can count the days before Xizang (Tibet) is liberated" (Kychanov and Melnichenko, 2005, p. 259). Similar letters were sent by several other high-ranking Tibetans from regions included in the Chinese provinces. On 2 November the Tibetan Foreign Ministry sent a message to Mao Zedong stating that Tibet has been an independent country since ancient times, no foreign power had any control over it, and called for negotiations on the return of Tibetan lands annexed by the previous governments of China. In January 1950, Mao Zedong in Moscow discussed a plan for military invasion to Tibet for its "transformation into a democracy of the Tibetan people", by telegraph with leaders of the CC CPC South-western Bureau and the Southwestern Military District. Mao enlisted support from J.V. Stalin, including military aid (Kuzmin 2010).

In March 1950 troops of the PLA moved from Sichuan to Kham. P. Wangyal helped them. Automobile roads and airport were being built at a great pace. While the roads were built, Tibetans of Sikang were

encouraged to participate in construction. People worked for money and fear. In addition, residents of Kham used to live "independently" and not taken to heart relations of Beijing with Lhasa. On October 7, 1950, Chinese offensive began in three areas. Major battles occurred at the north of the city of Chamdo. Its Governor Ngapo Ngawang Jigme ordered to destroy military stores, left the city and surrendered to the Chinese. On October 25, 1950, the PRC published statement that the PLA were ordered to move deeper into Tibet to "free three million Tibetans from the imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defense on the western borders of China" (Shakabpa 2003, p. 318). On November 10, the PLA issued a proclamation, according to which it enters Tibet to liberate its people from the oppression of British and American imperialism, so that the new Tibet within the new China may be built up; political and military system in Tibet will be not changed, and reforms will be carried out at the request of the population (Ling 1964, p. 8-9). In 1950 the Chinese created the first Tibet Autonomous area in the province of Sikan and the Autonomous County of Tienzhu (Pari) in Chinese Gansu Province. It was the prototypes of the future system of Tibetan "autonomies" in the PRC, the largest of which will be the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).

On November 17, 1950, the National Assembly transferred all Tibetan secular and religious authority to the 14th Dalai Lama. The captive Ngapo Ngawang Jigme sent two letters to Lhasa calling for negotiations to prevent military invasion. He was authorized to negotiate. On May 23, 1951, the "Agreement between the Central People's Government of China and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was signed in Beijing. Its analysis showed that it was signed under the threat of military force, the Tibetan delegates signed it without authorization from their government, with exceeding their authority, seals annexed to the agreement were not official but fabricated on site in Beijing, the preamble contained false

ideological clichés, a number of articles contained inner contradictions that allowed different interpretations by the parties, the territorial boundaries were not specified. The Chinese side then violated this Agreement, and the order of Zhou Enlai on March 28, 1959, at suppressing the Tibetan rebellion discarded this Agreement (Kuzmin 2010, p. 189-193, 243-244).

On November 9, 1951, the PLA entered Lhasa. Ngapo Ngawang Jigme and P. Wangyal arrived with them. At that time, the Chinese did not try to improve the "class consciousness" of the peasants on the territories of future TAR (Shakya 1999, p. 134). The Tibetan society was traditional, so CPC used the policy of "united front": the inclusion of influential Tibetans in power-holding structures. But these authorities were always controlled by the Han Communists. The Dalai Lama in 1954 was elected Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. This position was nominal and did not provide real power. Meanwhile, communications, infrastructure, cells of the CPC and other "patriotic" organizations were established in Tibet. The number of Tibetan revolutionaries has increased. On October 5, 1957, it was reported that Tibet already had more than 5000 revolutionary cadres, 1000 party members, more than 2000 members of the Youth Communist League, more than 6000 members of the Patriotic Youth Cultural Association and more than 1000 members of the Patriotic Women's Association (Ling 1964, p. 224).

In Tibetan regions Kham and Amdo the CPC already occupied a strong position and began the "democratic reform" for building of socialism, like in other Chinese provinces. The future TAR was an exception: historical conditions there were considered different. However, true reason was the lack of effective control of this area by the Chinese Government (Kuzmin 2010). Correspondingly, in Kham and Amdo people's uprisings were spread. Tibetans did not support the "democratic reform" considering it attack to the system of their values

(Shakya 1999, p. 143). The suppression of rebellions was accompanied by massacres and repressions, destruction of monasteries and other religious objects.

In the future TAR situation was quiet but more and more refugees penetrated there. In 1959 the rebellion spread over the whole of Tibet. G.T. Andrugtsang, merchant from Lithang, organized and headed all-Tibetan guerrilla movement Tensung Dangling Magar ("Volunteer Force for Protection of the [Buddhist] Doctrine"). Communist P. Wangyal unsuccessfully tried to conduct propaganda in favor of the Chinese authorities (Andrugtsang 1973, p. 48-49, 55). In March 1959, 23 guerrilla detachments operated in Eastern and 16 in Southern Tibet, total number of guerrillas may have reached 100-200 thousand (Patterson 1965 in Bogoslovsky 1978). PLA losses (killed and wounded), according to KMT data, amounted 65-75 thousand (Shakya 1999, p. 489).

Despite the fact that theocratic power was formally abolished by the Chinese, the 14th Dalai Lama continued to be the charismatic leader of Tibetan people. In Lhasa, rumour appeared that the Chinese are going to detain him. A crowd of thousands gathered around his palace. At night of 17 March the Dalai Lama with few confidants secretly left Lhasa and headed towards India under the protection of guerrillas. On March 20-23, Lhasa was bombarded and occupied by the PLA, which caused many casualties and destructions. Despite the occupation of Tibet, guerrilla movement continued. Before the Chinese Cultural Revolution 30-40 thousand Tibetan guerrillas operated between the river Tsangpo and Nepali border. Underground groups operated in Lhasa and elsewhere. In 1966 Mao Zedong initiated and led the Cultural Revolution. Suppression of the rebellion, repressions and the Cultural Revolution resulted in perishing of a large part of the Tibetans. According to various estimates, from 3% to 30% of Tibetans perished resulting from Mao's rule (1951-1976). Dozens of thousands emigrated (see Kuzmin, 2010, for detail).

However, all these events have not led to de-legitimization of the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibetan people. Structures having continuity from governments of independent Tibet survived in India in the form of the Central Tibetan Administration. In 2011 the Dalai Lama resigned from the position of secular leader of the Tibetans, which can be considered a termination of the Tibetan theocratic monarchy.

### Conclusion

The concept of using revolutionary state for promotion of revolutions abroad originated from revolutionary France (Halliday 1999, p. 104). This was manifested in the establishment of republics resulted from French military invasions. These invasions promoted the spread of the "French Enlightenment", which was one of the ideological preconditions of the French Revolution (1789-1799). Later, F. Engels indicated that the communist revolution "is a worldwide revolution and will therefore have the world arena" (Engels, [1847]). Later, this idea has been widely used by Bolsheviks and later by Maoists. Communists introduced a new method of foreign relations: with peoples and not with states that was used as a basis of their contacts with foreign opposition movements (Halliday 1999, p. 95). Correspondingly, invasion of foreign revolutionary forces was motivated by the fact that local workers suffer from "exploiters" and "foreign imperialists" but they are not able to liberate themselves.

Bolsheviks until the end of the 1920s followed the doctrine of the World Revolution. For its implementation the Comintern was created on March 4, 1919. On March 6, 1919, at its founding Congress, V.I. Lenin said: "Victory of the proletarian revolution throughout the world is ensured. International Soviet Republic is coming" (Lenin, Complete works, vol. 37, p. 511). In his report at the 2nd Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East on November 22, 1919, Lenin also indicated the necessity of the union of "advanced workers" around the

world with "working people and exploited masses of the East" (Lenin, Complete works, vol. 39, p. 319-330). L.D. Trotsky, at that time member of the Politbureau CC RCP(b) and the Chairman of the Military Council, then the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, expressed these ideas clearly: "More favorable balance of forces imposes on the working state the duty of aid to revolutionary movements in other countries not only morally but, if necessary, also with the help of armed force" (Trotsky 1936). The first Constitution of USSR in 1924 stated that creation of the Soviet Union "will be the true bulwark against world capitalism and a new decisive step towards the unification of working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic". At the 1st Congress of Peoples of the East in September 1920 famous Marxist slogan was reformulated as "Proletarians of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!" As noted in the resolution of the Congress, "oppressed peasantry of the East in the revolutionary struggle counts on the support of revolutionary workers of the West, the Comintern, existing and future Soviet states" (Pervyi Sjezd... 1920, p. 184).

These data show that the policy of Bolsheviks at that time was the World Revolution. This type of globalism meant elimination of all borders and creation of a global communist state, but not restoration of the collapsed Russian Empire. However, Soviet revolutions of 1918-1919 in Finland, Germany and Hungary failed. The Gilan Soviet Socialist Republic existed in Iran from June 1920 to September 1921. Campaign of the Red Army to Afghanistan was planned in 1920. In case of its success, in Tashkent the "Afghan revolutionary party" had been prepared to establish People's Republic in Afghanistan. Underground circle was established on Soviet money inside Afghanistan. These plans were not implemented due to the absence of social support for the lefts and to development of the Soviet-Afghani cooperation (Boiko 1995, p. 74-81; Abdullaev 2009, p. 161).

Taking into consideration bad experiences, Lenin warned against "pushing" revolution in cases when it leads to defeat (Lenin, Complete Works, vol. 35: 403). However, in some countries the situation was appropriate for "help" to revolutions.

Despite all differences between Khiva, Bukhara, Mongolia and Tibet in their historical trajectories, there were some similarities in the first half of the 20th Century. All they were absolute monarchies with religious legitimization of the power of their monarchs; they were dependent on Russia or China; their societies were traditional, geopolitical positions seemed favorable to foreign influences. RSFSR/USSR and PRC were guided by the same ideology, Marxism-Leninism and pursued the same goal, building of communism. As there were no internal prerequisites for revolutions in Mongolia, Tibet, Khiva and Bukhara, it had to be exported there, because no internal and external forces could effectively prevent this. "Export of revolution" conventionally means active promotion of revolution in other countries by a revolutionary regime (Halliday 1999, p. 94). Such revolutions were considered "anti-imperialist", "people's" etc., and the resultant "people's republics" considered a transitional stage to socialist republics with the prospect of communism.

Methods of export of revolution from the Soviet Russia and China were different according to different geopolitics of these powers.

The RCP(b) and Comintern considered Mongolia only as a springboard for spread of revolution to China for incitement of the World Revolution. Central Asia was also considered as a springboard for the spread of revolution to neighboring countries (Abdulloev 2009, p. 137; Kudukhov 2012b, p. 187). But in the late 1920s, under the influence of Stalin's concept of building socialism in a single country, the idea of World Revolution had lost its relevance. It was not mentioned in the Soviet Constitution of 1936. USSR was created as a federation of republics with equal rights. The Russians were not prevailed in the

Soviet leadership. Moreover, most of the first or general secretaries of the CC AUCP(b)/CPSU were not Russians by nationality. RSFSR as a part of the USSR was also federation of national autonomies and different types of provincial units.

In China the situation is different. The CPC to the time of its coming to power refused not only from the Leninist concept of the right of nations to self-determination, but also from federalization of the PRC. Instead, it used sinocentric historical myth, according to which Tibet since ancient times was inalienable part of China (Kuzmin 2010; Dmitriev and Kuzmin 2012, p. 5-19, 2014, p. 5-17). The PRC leadership was always prevailed by the Han, they occupied highest positions in the TAR and the PRC as a whole, and just they have developed policy in relation to Chinese "autonomies".

Before revolutions common people of Khiva, Bukhara, Mongolia and Tibet, if they had rebelled, did that against particular injustices, or uprisings had inter-ethnic or inter-clan character. There was no social request for revolution. Europeans and Japanese had no serious influence on situations in these countries; Baron Ungern in Mongolia acted under the sanction of its legitimate monarch.

In these states were formed small groups of local people who had been indoctrinated from abroad with foreign revolutionary views. As a result of such indoctrination, members of these groups have come to the conclusion on the need to replace "backward" systems of their countries to any form of "progressive" system. These groups relied on foreign Red parties: MPP, Young Bukharans, Bukharan and Xorazmi communists on RCP(b)/CPSU(b), the Tibetan communists on CPC. In their own countries these groups had no social support (Tibet) or had very weak support (Mongolia, Khiva and Bukhara). They could not come to power by themselves.

These groups with the help of Bolsheviks in Khiva, Bukhara and Mongolia gave rise to communist and/or pro-communist parties created

under the auspices of RCP(b). These parties asked to bring foreign Red Army in their countries for the aid to revolution. Local Soviets in Khiva and Bukhara leant initially on European populations, and communist parties of these countries were created outside of them (Starikov 2016, p. 17). The same concerns MPP. As a result, Red Army under the command of Bolsheviks brought these local parties to power. The export of revolution to Tibet was different. It was realized by the PLA invasion at the absence of relevant Tibetan party and its requests.

As a result, monarchs were deposed: the Khan of Khiva abdicated and was sent to RSFSR, the Emir of Bukhara fled to Afghanistan, the 8th Bogd Gegeen lost secular power and spent the rest of his life in Mongolia under the MPP control, the 14th Dalai Lama had to cooperate with CPC trying to avoid turmoil in Tibet and in 1959 emigrated to India.

Military actions were everywhere combined with propaganda in favor of local revolutionary parties, and the army participated in this. Increase in the number of local communist cadres and their control from "Centres" were also common for these states. At first, when communists or their protégées had not enough power, they used the policy of "united front" with "progressive" members of nobility and clergy. In addition, authorities at that stage used a part of clergy ready to compromise with regard to religion: the thesis of compatibility of the Sharia and communism that attracted a part of the mullahs in Central Asia (Gusterin 2012, p. 92-100), the movement of "renovationists" in the Buddhism of Mongolia.

The power of feudal lords was eliminated first, and then clergy became one of the main subjects for struggle. Both Buddhism and Islam were declared "opium of the people" which should be eliminated. Members of clergy were converted to secular or persecuted, temples and mosques closed and destroyed, objects of worship desecrated or destroyed. Atheist, anti-feudal and anti-monarchist propaganda was conducted, private property collectivized.

These resulted in broad discontent of people, armed movements and conspiracies, as well as considerable emigration abroad. In the period of collectivization and the first wave of destruction of religion in late 1920s–1932 sharp rising of the Basmachi movement occurred in Central Asia, and unprecedented rebellions in 1930–1932 in Mongolia. The "democratic reform" in the PRC from mid-1950s led to unprecedented national rebellion of the Tibetans.

Basmachi was a plural anti-modernist movement based on Islam. Main common features were rejection of the Red power, loyalty to Islam and involvement of large numbers of common people. In Mongolia and Tibet people's rebellions were also based on the protection of religion (Buddhism) and traditionalism; they were not well organized in military and political terms. Rebellions in Central Asia and Tibet received a small and ineffective support from the UK and USA, who were interested in destabilizing of RSFSR and PRC but not in the independence of Khiva, Bukhara and Tibet. In Mongolia, contrary to popular opinion, the rebels were not supported by foreign forces. Moreover, just the suppression of all these rebellions was possible due to foreign influences: fighting of the Soviet Red Army against the Basmachi, that of the PLA against the Tibetan guerrillas, and the decisive assistance of the Soviet Union to the Mongolian People's Army and security forces.

Rebellions threatened power of the pro-communist parties in Bukhara and Mongolia. As a result, "new course" was introduced there. Its essence was the suspension of collectivization and other socialist reforms, as well as intensive propaganda and measures to raise well-being of people while severe suppression of the rebellions. Then the repressions in 1930s have come, which led to elimination of the remains of old institutions there. The same result in Tibet was achieved by suppression of the rebellion and by the Maoist Cultural Revolution.

Repressions and the crush of religion in Mongolia became, in fact, the charge of its independence, while in Tibet it was the charge of losing its independence.

Thus, elimination of monarchies in the countries of Inner Asia in the early 20th Century took place by the export of revolution. There were no internal preconditions and resources for revolutions in these states.

#### References

- **Abdullaev, K.N. (2009).** Ot Sintszyana do Khorasana. Iz Istorii Sredneaziatskoi Emigratsii XX Veka [From Xinjiang to Horasan. From the History of Middle-Asian Emigration of the 20th Century]. Dushanbe: Irfon.
- AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation, Moscow.
- Babakhojaev, A.P., Iskanderov, B.I., Ishanov, A.I., Mukhammedberdyev, K.B., Nepesov, G.N., Popov, G.V., Samatova, H.S. and Shaumian, M.H. (1967). Put Bukhary i Khivy k Sotsializmu [The Way of Khiva and Bukhara to Socialism]. Moscow.
- **Bazarov, B.V. (ed.) (2012).** Mongoliya v Dokumentakh Kominterna [Mongolia in the Documents of Comintern]. Pt. 1 (1919–1929). Pt. 2 (1930–1934). Ulan-Ude: BNTs SO RAN.
- **Becker, S. (2004).** Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924. London New York: Routledge Curzon.
- **Belov, E.A. (2003).** Baron Ungern fon Shternberg: Biografiya, Ideologiya, Voennye Pokhody 1920–1921 gg. [Baron Ungern von Sternberg: Biography, Ideology and Military Campaigns in 1920–1921] Moscow: Agraf.
- **Bogoslovsky, V.A.** *Tibetskii Raion KNR (1949–1976)* [Tibetan Region of the PRC (1949–1976)]. Moscow: Nauka.

- Boiko, V.S. (1995). Sovetskaya Rossiya i Afganskie Levoradikalnye Gruppy Nachala 1920-kh Godov [Soviet Russia and Afghani Left Radical Groups in the Early 1920s] // Annaly IVRAN. Vol. 2. Available at http://www.altspu.ru/Res/orient/proj/AfghanLeft.html#3
- Chirkin, S.V. (2006). *Dvadtsat Let Sluzhby na Vostoke* [Twenty Years at the Service on the East]. Moscow: Russkii Put.
- **Dmitriev, S.V. and Kuzmin, S.L. (2012).** Chto takoe Kitai? Sredinnoe gosudarstvo v istoricheskom mife i realnoi politike [What is China? The Middle State in historical myth and real policy] // Vostok (Oriens), no 3. Moscow.
- **Dmitriev, S.V. and Kuzmin, S.L. (2014).** Imperiya Tsin kak Kitai: anatomiya istoricheskogo mifa [Qing Empire as China: anatomy of a historical myth] // Vostok (Oriens), no 1.
- Eleutov, T.E. and Inoyatov, Kh.Sh. (1964). Iz Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voiny v SSSR. Dokumenty i Materialy. Inostrannaya Voennaya Interventsiya i Grazhdanskaya Voina v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane [From the History of Civil War in the USSR. Documents and Materials. Foreign Military Intervention in Middle Asia and Kazakhstan]. Alma-Ata: Nauka. Vol. 1. 1963, vol. 2, 1964.
- **Engels, F. (1847).** *Printsipy Kommunizma* [Principles of Communism]. Available at http://engels.filosoff.org/tvorchestvo/principy-kommunizma/pagen/3/
- Genis, V. (2000). "Butaforskaya revolyutsiya" ili rossiiskoe polpredstvo v Khive v 1920 g. ["Fake revolution", or Russian mission in Khiva in 1920] // Vostok (Oriens), no 2. Moscow.
- Genis, V. (2001). "S Bukharoi nado konchat..." K Istorii Butaforskikh Revolyutsii. Dokumentalnaya Khronika ["It Should be Ended with Bukhara..." To the History of Fake Revolutions. Domunetary Chronicle]. Moscow: MNPI.

- Genis, V.L. (1993). Razgrom Bukharskogo Emirata v 1920 Godu [Destruction of the Emirate of Bukhara in 1920] // Voprosy Istorii, no 7. Moscow.
- Goldstein, M.C. (1992). A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951. The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of California.
- **Goldstein, M.C. (2007).** *A History of Modern Tibet.* Vol. 2. Berkeley Los Angeles London: University of California.
- **Goldstein, M.C. (2014).** A History of Modern Tibet. Vol. 3. University of California Press.
- **Gusterin, P.V. (2012).** Politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva na musulmanskom Vostoke v 1917-1921 gg. [The policy of Soviet state at the Muslim East in 1917–1921] // Voprosy istorii, no 1. Moscow.
- **Halliday, F. (1999).** Revolution and World Politics. The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power. London: Macmillan.
- **Ishanov**, **A.I.** (1955). Sozdanie Bukharskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki (1920–1924 gg.). [Creation of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic]. Tashkent: Acad. Sci. Uzbek SSR.
- **Ishanov, A.I.** (1967). *Pobeda Narodnoi Sovetskoi Revolyutsii v Bukhare* [Victory of People's Soviet Revolution in Bukhara]. Tashkent: Acad. Sci. Uzbek SSR.
- **Ishanov**, **A.I.** (1969). *Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublika* [Bukharan People's Soviet Republic]. Tashkent: Uzbekistan.
- Iskandarov, B.I. (1970). Bukhara (1918–1920). Dushanbe: Donish.
- **Ismailov, A.I. and Bazarbaev, K.K. (2013)**. Jadidizm istoriya prosvetitelnogo dvizheniya i svobodomysliya v Srednei Azii, konets XIX nachalo XX veka [Jadidism: history of the elucidative movement and freethinking in Middle Asia, end of the 19th beginning of 20th centuries] // Bylye Gody, vol. 1, no 27.

- **Khojaev, F. (1932).** K istorii revolyutsii v Bukhare i natsionalnogo razmezhevaniya Srednei Azii [To the history of revolution in Bukhara and national delimitation in Middle Asia]. Available at http://booksee.org/book/341014
- Kudryavtsev, I.I., Bazarov, B.V., Ganjurov, V.C., Dmitrochenkova,
  E.N., Nagaev, I.M., Tarkhova, N.S., Shepelev, V.N.,
  Oyuunbazar, T., Gantulga, J., Gombosuren, D. and
  Khishigt, N.(compilers). (2008). Rossiisko-Mongolskoe
  Voennoe Sotrudnichestvo (1911–1946). Sbornik Dokumentov
  [Russian Mongolian Military Cooperation (1911–1946).
  Collection of Documents]. Pt. 1. Moscow Ulan-Ude: FGOU
  VPO VSGAKI.
- **Kudukhov K.S. (2012b)**. Krakh politiki Kominterna s tselyuu sozdaniya "bukharskogo platsdarma" (1920–1921) [Fail of the Comintern policy for creation the "Bukharan bridgehead"] // Nauchnye Vedomosti BelGU. Seriya Istoriya, Politologiya, Ekonomika, Informatika, vol. 1 (120), no 21. Belgorod.
- **Kudukhov, K.S. (2012a).** Komintern i "bukharskii eksperiment" [Comintern and the "Bukharan experiment"] // Vostochnyi Arkhiv, vol. 2, no 26. Moscow.
- **Kuts, I.F. (1964).** *Gody v Sedle* [Years in Saddle]. Moscow: Voenizdat. Available at http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kuts if/index.html
- Kuzmin, S.L. (ed., comp.). (2004). Baron Ungern v Dokumentakh i Memuarakh [Baron Ungern in Documents and Memoirs]. Moscow: KMK. Available at https://www.academia.edu/7730721/%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%B7%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD\_%D0%A1.%D0%9B.\_%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4.\_%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82.\_2004.\_%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD %D0%A3%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%B5%D1%8

- 0%D0%BD\_%D0%B2\_%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%85\_%D0%B8\_%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%85.\_%D0%9C.\_%D0%9A%D0%9C%D0%9A\_Kuzmin\_S.L.\_ed.\_2004.\_Baron\_Ungern\_in\_Documents and Memoirs. Moscow KMK Sci. Press
- **Kuzmin, S.L. (2010).** *Skrytyi Tibet. Istorija Nezavisimosti i Okkupatsii* [Hidden Tibet. History of Independence and Occupation]. St. Petersburg: A. Terentyev Publ. Available at http://www.savetibet.ru/2010/03/10/tibet book.html
- Kuzmin, S.L. (2015). Tibetskoe gosudarstvo: istoricheskie fakty i mezhdunarodnoe pravo [The State of Tibet: historical facts and international law] // Eurasia: Statum et Legem, vol. 1, no 4. Available at https://www.academia.edu/12054909/%D0%9A% D1%83%D0%B7%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD % D0%A1.%D0%9B. 2015. %D0%A2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0 %B5%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5 %D0 %B3%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%8 0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE %D0%B8%D1%81 %D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D 1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5 %D1%84%D0%B0%D0 %BA%D1%82%D1%8B %D0%B8 %D0%BC%D0%B5%D 0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0 %BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5 %D0%BF%D1 %80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE Kuzmin S.L. 2015. The State of Tibet historical facts and international law
- **Kuzmin, S.L. (2016).** *Teokraticheskaya Gosudarstvennost i Buddiiskaya Tserkov Mongolii v Nachale XX Veka* [Theocratic Statehood and Buddhist Church of Mongolia in the Beginning of the 20th Century]. Moscow: KMK.

- Kuzmin, S.L. and Oyuunchimeg, J. (2015). Vooruzhennoe Vosstanie v Mongolii v 1932 g. [Armed Rebellion in Mongolia in 1932] Moscow: MBA. Available at https://book.ivran.ru/f/kuzmin-sl-oyuunchimeg-zh-vooruzhennoe-vosstanie-v-mongolii-1932.pdf
- **Kychanov, E.I., Melnichenko, B.N. (2005).** *Istoriya Tibeta* [History of Tibet]. Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura. Available at https://www.torchinov.com/
- **Lenin, V.I.** *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii* [Collected Works]. Available at https://leninism.su/works.html
- Ling, N. (1964). *Tibetan Sourcebook*. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute.
- **Medvedev, V. (1992a).** Basmachi obrechennoe voinstvo [Basmachi, the doomed army] // Druzhba narodov, no 8. Moscow.
- **Medvedev, V. (1992b).** Nechayannaya Revolyutsiya. Bukhara, 1920 g. [Unexpected revolution. Bukhara, 1920]. // Druzhba narodov, no 8. Moscow.
- Morozova, I.Y. (2009). Socialist Revolutions in Asia. The Social History of Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. London New York: Routledge.
- Mukhammedberdyev, K. (1959). Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Borbe za Pobedu Narodnoi Sovetskoi Revolyutsii v Khorezme [Communist Party in the Fight for the Victory of People's Soviet Revolution in Xorazm]. Ashhabad: Turkmengosizdat.
- **MUUTA, MBT** Central National State Archive, Center of the MPP documentation, Ulaanbaatar.
- **Nepesov, G. (1962).** *Iz Istorii Khorezmskoi Revolyutsii 1920–1924 gg.* [From the History of the Xorazm Revolution, 1920–1924] Tashkent: Gosizdat UzSSR.
- O Natsionalnom Razmezhevanii v Srednei Azii. Doklady na Plenume Sredazbyuro TsK VKP(b) 5 Sentyabrya (1934 g). [On National Delimitation in Middle Asia. Reports on the Plenum of the

- Middle Asian Bureau of CC AUCP(b) on September 5, 1934] 1934. Moscow–Tashkent: Obedinenie Gosizdatelstv.
- **Pershin, D.P. (1999).** *Baron Ungern, Urga i Altan-Bulak* [Baron Ungern, Urga and Altanbulag]. Samara: Agni.
- Pervyi Sjezd Narodov Vostoka. Baku 1–8 Sentyabrya (1920 g).

  Stenograficheskie Otchety. 1920 [First Congress of the Peoples of the East. Baku, September 1–8, 1920. Stenographic Reports].

  Petrograd: Comintern.
- **Pogorelsky, I.V.** (1984). *Istoriya Khivinskoi Revolyutsii i Khorezmskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki.* 1917–1924 gg. [History of the Khivan Revolution and the Xorazm People's Soviet Republic, 1917–1924]. Leningrad: Leningrad State Univ.
- **Promises and lies: "The 17-point Agreement".** The full story as revealed by the Tibetans and Chinese who were involved. 2001 // Tibetan Bull., March–June.
- **RGASPI** Russian State Archive and Social and Political History, Moscow.
- Roshchin, S.K. (1999). Politicheskaya Istoriya Mongolii (1921–1940 gg.) [Political History of Mongolia (1921–1940)]. Moscow: Inst. of Oriental Studies, Russian Acad. Sci.
- Savin, V. (1994). "Tushit pozhar i vyvozit gromadnye tsennosti emira". Kak proizoshla "narodnaja revolyutsiya" v Turkestkane ["Extinguish the fire and take out the huge values of the Emir". How the "people's revolution" in Turkestan occurred] // Istochnik [The Source], no 5. Moscow.
- **Shakabpa, V.D. (2003).** *Tibet: Politicheskaya Istoriya* [Tibet: Political History]. St. Petersburg: Narthang.
- Shakya, Ts. (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows. A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. London: Pimlico.

- **Shakya, Ts. (2005).** The prisoner // New Left Review. Vol. 34. Available at https://newleftreview.org/II/34/tsering-shakya-the-prisoner
- **Starikov, I.V. (2016).** Gosudarstvennyi stroi Khorezmskoi i Bukharskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (1920–1924) [State system of Xorazm and Bukhara people's Soviet republics] // Vestnik Chelyabinskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta [Bulletin of Chelyabinsk State Univ.]. Seriya Pravo. Vol. 1, no 4.
- **Trotsky**, **L.D.** (1936). Zayavleniya i otkroveniya Stalina [Statements and revelations of Stalin] // Bulleten Oppozitsii (Bolshevikov-Lenintsev) [Bulletin of Opposition (Bolsheviks-Leninists]. Available at http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/FI/BO/BO-49.shtml
- Vais, M.L. and Inoyatov, Kh.Sh. (1976). Istoriya Khorezmskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki (1920–1924 gg.). Sbornik Dokumentov [History of Xorazm People's Republic (1920–1924). Collection of Documents]. Tashkent: FAN.
- **Zimanov, S.** (1976). Ot Osvoboditelnykh Idei k Sovetskoi Gosudarstvennosti v Bukhare i Khive [From Ideas of Liberation to Soviet Statehood in Bukhara and Khiva]. Alma-Ata: Nauka.

Received 06 Apr 2018, Screened 05 Nov 2018, Accepted 20 Nov 2018.